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Abstract
At the heart of this work is a curiosity as to why expert performers, who have
so practised their skill that they can execute it perfectly time after time, often
fail when under extreme pressure to perform well. The work begins with
discussion of key issues in performance, such as implicit versus explicit
knowledge, the passage of learning - from novice to expert, controlled to
automatic - the effects of stress on skill performance and the nature of skill
failure.
Once the foundations of the research have been layed the thesis embarks on a
number of investigations which suggest that it is possible to teach a motor skill
without the learner ever acquiring conscious, explicit knowledge of the rules
for executing it, that acquiring a skill in this manner may make it less likely to
fail under stress because the performer has no explicit knowledge with which
to execute the skill, that some individuals have more of a predisposition than
others to try to run their skill with explicit knowledge and that these
individuals are more likely to fail under stress.
The thesis concludes that traditional methods of instructing performers, which
emphasise explicit, technical 'know-how', and require the performer to be very
conscious of the action, are not necessarily the most effective methods of skill
acquisition if the skill is not to fail under pressure. The implication, as the
author illustrates in the final chapter, is that alternative methods of instruction
or coaching need to be developed which at least reduce the degree to which the
performer is conscious of the rules for executing his or her chosen skill.
Prologue
In 1958 Boris Pasternak wrote his famous novel "Doctor Zhivago". At one
point Yura Andreyevich Zhivago delivers an impromptu lecture to Anna
Ivanovna Gromeko on life and death:
"To try consciously to go to sleep is a sure way to have insomnia.
To try to be conscious of one's own digestion is a sure way to
upset the stomach. Consciousness is a poison when we apply it
to ourselves. Consciousness is a beam of light directed outwards,
it lights up the way ahead of us so that we don't trip up. It's like
the head-lamps on a railway engine - if you turned the beam
inwards there would be a catastrophe."
(from Doctor Zhivago by Boris Pasternak, 1958)
In 1989 in the United States Golf Championship an American, Scott Hoch,
missed not one but two gimmes (extremely easy putts) at the death. Had he
holed either putt he would have been champion. Instead, Nick Faldo of
England became champion. In 1986 Steve Davis, that most clinical of the
great snooker players, missed the final black of the final frame to lose the
World Championship. Ivan Lendl played brilliant grass-court tennis in 1991
to win the Queen's Club tournament yet at Wimbledon the week after, where
he so wanted to win, Lendl lost appallingly. In the same week at Wimbledon
Martina Navratilova double faulted at match point down to lose to the young
American Jennifer Capriati. In the semi-final of soccer's World Cup in 1990
both Chris Waddle and Stuart Pearce missed penalties against West
Germany.
[1]
On the other hand, Stefan Edberg - the then world number one tennis player
- commented on one of his great performances, "I had one of those days
when I played almost perfect tennis... In the third set you start to think a little
bit and wonder if it is a dream, but I said to myself 'just keep concentrating
on each point'. If you start to think you can easily get into trouble" (The
Times, Jan., 1990). Following a famous victory in the 1987 French Open
Tennis Championships Martina Navratilova told journalists, "I played for an
hour and I don't think I missed a shot. Everything was happening without
my having to think". Juan Belmonte, the famous spanish bull-fighter, said of
the fight which made him a legend in his country, "all at once I forgot the
public, the other bull-fighters, myself, and even the bull.. .1 simply fought as I
believe one ought to fight, without a thought, outside my own faith in what I
was doing" (Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1937). Lisa Opie, British Squash
Champion many times over, said "but the best match I must ever have
played, I can't remember a thing about...I might remember the first service,
but that's all. I was in a trance of concentration, a cocoon of invincibility. I
came off, and still don't have a clue about the score. Except that I beat her.
You play by instinct, by auto-pilot, and you win famously. It's uncanny" (The
Guardian, Nov., 1988).
How do these periods of peak performance as well as these famous failures
of skill relate to a lecture on life and death by a fictional character in a classic
novel? In all of the examples cited an inward turning of attention, a focusing
of consciousness on the act to be performed, was either absent when peak
performance occurred or very probably present when skill failure took place.
This thesis explores the inward turning of 'consciousness' in human motor
actions and argues from Yura Andreyevich Zhivago's premise that turning
the beam of consciousness inwards while performing can be catastrophic in
even highly skilled actions. The thesis will look toward inhibiting
catastrophes if inward turning does occur and predicting in whom inward
turning of consciousness is most likely to occur.
[2]
Chapter One
An Introduction
1.1 Implicit learning
To become conscious of something in Zhivago's terms can be construed as
registering knowledge explicitly, with or without intention. According to
many authors knowledge can be explicit or implicit (Berry & Broadbent,
1984, 1987, 1988; Evans, 1982; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Reber, 1967, 1976,
1989; Reber & Allen, 1978). Explicit knowledge is made up of facts and rules
of which we are specifically aware and, therefore, able to articulate. Implicit
knowledge is made up of that which we 'know' yet are not aware of, and
thus, cannot articulate. Reber (1989, p.219) claims that the term 'implicit
learning' was originally employed to describe the development of "intuitive
knowledge about the underlying structure of a complex stimulus
environment". In earlier work Reber (1967) argued that implicit learning is an
unconscious process yielding abstract knowledge in the absence of conscious
attempts to learn. Two paradigms most often illustrating implicit learning in
the literature are the acquisition of synthetic grammars and learning to
control complex systems. A typical example of implicit learning in synthetic
grammar can be seen in a study by Reber (1967) in which participants
became more sensitive to the underlying structure of the grammar as they
learned sets of letter strings from that grammar. The task of learning these
strings was described as part of a rote learning memory experiment so
participants were not aware of an underlying rule structure to the strings.
Implicit learning was shown by the fact that (a) the ability to process and
memorise these strings improved with practice on letter strings with an
underlying rule structure but not on letter strings lacking such structure and
[3]
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(b) participants were able to distinguish between grammatically correct and
incorrect letter strings, despite an inability to articulate the underlying rules
upon which they based their decisions. This has been shown to be a highly
robust method of illustrating implicit learning (Brooks, 1978; Howard &
Ballas, 1980; Morgan & Newport, 1981; Reber, 1976; Reber & Allen, 1978;
Reber, Kassin, Lewis & Cantor, 1980).
The existence of implicit learning has also been shown in the control of
complex systems (Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1987, 1988; Broadbent, FitzGerald
& Broadbent, 1986; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988). Such complex systems were
invented by Broadbent and his colleagues and commonly involve interaction
via computer. In the most well known system, participants are placed in an
imaginary manufacturing environment such as the sugar production task
(Berry & Broadbent, 1984; McGeorge & Burton, 1989). In this task
participants are required to maintain specific production levels by altering
variables such as the number of employees or wage scales. Systems such as
this function on complex underlying rule structures, suggesting that in order
to achieve successful control of production the participant must have some
form of knowledge about the rule structure. The consistent finding from
studies employing such complex systems is that the underlying rule
structures are derived implicitly and adjustments in variables are carried out
in the absence of explicit, verbalisable knowledge of the underpinning rule
structures governing the way the variables interact in the system. For
example, Berry & Broadbent (1984) reported that practice in controlling the
sugar production task led to improved performance but made no difference
when it came to answering written questions about the completed task,
whereas, verbal instruction in how to carry out the task led to improvement
in post-task question answering but not in performance. Broadbent et al
(1986), Morris & Rouse (1985) and Rouse & Morris (1986) also found this.
Little research exists on implicit learning and actual motor-skill performance.
The closest approximation in the literature is found in a method employed by
Lewicki, Czyzewska & Hoffman (1987) and subsequently replicated by
Lewicki, Hill & Bizot (1988) and Stadler (1989) in which implicit learning was
[4]
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demonstrated in a visual search task. The location of every seventh target
was determined by the target locations in the previous six trials. Subjects
located the target significantly more quickly on the seventh trial when
compared to occasions upon which the previous six trials were not
determinants of target location, despite having no explicit knowledge of the
rules governing the sequencing of target locations. Nissen & Bullemer (1987)
employed a somewhat similar method with the same results. Although these
results provide support for the concept of implicit learning they do not give
an insight into implicit learning and its effects on motor skill performance.
1.2 The passage of learning: From inexpert to expert
Despite the scarcity of empirical investigation into implicit learning of motor
skill there has been much research into other phenomena associated with
skill acquisition, particularly the development of autonomous performance.
That is, performance in which little conscious processing occurs, yet the
performance is efficient and effortless. Such 'automaticity' (especially in sport
where the potential rewards; fame and fortune, provide a high motivation to
perfect the skill) is the end result of many performances involving explicit
learning, yet it seems to run on a mixture enriched by implicit knowledge. It
is widely accepted that a developing skill will pass from a cognitive through
an associative phase before reaching an autonomous phase in which the skill
is automatic (Fitts & Posner, 1967). In the cognitive phase, knowledge is
explicit and rule based, and performance is slow, erratic and requires much
effort. In the autonomous phase, knowledge is implicit and non-verbalisable,
and performance is smooth, effortless and fast. This basic distinction is
common across a number of more recent theories of skill acquisition. For
instance, replace cognitive phase with 'declarative stage', autonomous phase
with 'procedural stage', make a few minor changes and one is in essence
looking at Anderson's (1982) Adaptive Control of Thought Theory (ACT) of
skill acquisition. Replace declarative stage with 'controlled processing',
procedural stage with 'automatic processing', make a few minor changes and
one is looking essentially at the view held by Schneider & Fisk (1983),
Schneider & Shiffrin (1977), Shiffrin & Dumais (1981) and Shiffrin &
[5]
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Schneider (1977). The fundamental communality between the various
theories is very much the move from explicit to implicit knowledge. In fact,
although there are those who have suggested, in a more cognitive than motor
sense, that a skill may initially develop without an explicit, declarative
encoding of knowledge (Brooks, 1978; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Reber,
1967), most investigators of skill learning rely on the fundamental belief that
skill acquisition begins with declarative, explicit encoding of knowledge in
which the demands on 'cognitive' processing are high and ends with
procedural, implicit encoding in which the demands are low. Take, for
example, the explanatory models of motor learning and performance touted
by Adams (1971) and Schmidt (1975) in which performance of a motor skill is
seen to be slow and jerky early on due to closed-loop type explicit processing
of feedback, but smooth and fast later in learning as a result of development
of less demanding open-loop movement.'
Even Logan's (1988) Instance Theory of automaticity makes way for a shift
from explicit encoding of knowledge to implicit encoding. Logan sees
automaticity as a phenomenon of the memory related aspects of attention
rather than its limited capacity aspects. According to Logan (1988, p.493):
"Automaticity is memory retrieval: Performance is automatic
when it is based on single-step direct-access retrieval of past
solutions from memory. The theory assumes that novices begin
with a general algorithm that is sufficient to perform the task. As
they gain experience, they learn specific solutions to specific
problems, which they retrieve when they encounter the same
problems again. Then, they can respond with the solution
retrieved from memory or the one computed by the algorithm.
At some point, they may gain enough experience to respond
I Schmidt's Schema Theory was offered as an alternative to Adam's Closed-loop Theory in
answer to both the novelty and storage problems presented by Adam's model. The closed-
loop nature of Adam's model requires a one-to-one mapping between a previously stored
feedback reference and every single movement to be executed. This results in (a) a need for
a countless supply of feedback states in storage and (b) an inability to account for the fact
that no one movement is ever replicated exactly. In it's barest form, Schmidt's theory
negotiates these problems with a generalised motor program (GMP) for each given class of
movement and a motor response schema which is an abstraction of the sought movement
allowing it to be executed under the auspices of the particular GMP governing that class of
movement.
[6]
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with a solution from memory on every trial and abandon the
algorithm entirely. At that point, their performance is automatic.
Automatization reflects a transition from algorithm-based
performance to memory-based performance."
Logan goes on to argue that the learning mechanism in skill acquisition is the
accumulation of individual episodic traces through experience, leading to
gradual development from algorithmic (more explicit) processing to
memory-based (more implicit) processing.2
1.3 Skill failure: From expert to inexpert
Regardless of the twists and turns in the passage of learning the
characteristics of expertise would appear to involve functioning of an
automatic, effortless, implicit nature. Expert performance can break down,
however, if 'reinvested' with explicit knowledge. This has been expressed in
a kaleidoscope of ways. Deikman (1969) called it 'deautomatization' which he
conceptualized as the "undoing of automatization, presumably by reinvesting
actions and percepts with attention" (p.31). Baddeley and Woodhead (1982)
suggested that attempting to facilitate automated skills by isolating and
focusing on specific components of the skill would often result in a
decrement in performance, and Klatzky (1984) expounded on "the common
notions that awareness of performance decreases with practice, and that
becoming aware impairs execution of a skilled act" (p.62). Hammond (1987)
offered this view when discussing slips of action, which are instances in
which normally efficient tasks fail:
"The automaticity framework suggests two basic causes of
control failure: failures occurring when the person is in
automatic mode but should have been exercising controlled
2 A storage problem identical to that present in Adam's Closed-loop Theory (see Footnote
1) exists in Logan's Instance Theory also. Logan's concept of the accumulation of individual
episodic traces through experience makes no provision for the fact that countless specific
traces must be stored in memory if every possible movement is to be accounted for. While
there is no direct evidence that the brain would not be capable of handling such a problem,
it would appear to be a very inefficient way in which to operate, given the flexibility of
highly skilled performance.
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processing, and the obverse, where controlled processing
interferes with an automatic process best left to its own devices."
(p.167)
Henry and Rogers (1960) proposed a "memory drum" theory of neuromotor
coordination which predicted that efforts consciously to control a movement
would interfere with the programming, causing increased reaction latency
and poor coordination:
"The theory of neuromuscular coordination...holds that the
detailed motor components of a fast complicated movement are
controlled by a nonconscious motor memory mechanism that
programs the flow of nerve impulses through the appropriate
centers and nerves to produce the desired motor act. According
to this theory, attempts to institute conscious control of the
movement will interfere with the programming, thus increasing
reaction latency and tending to cause a poorly coordinated
movement."
(Henry, 1960, p.459)
Henry hypothesised that on these grounds the reaction time and movement
time of an individual using motor set to execute a skill, that is, directing
attention towards the motor response or skill itself, would be slower than
when using sensory set to execute the skill, that is, directing attention
towards the stimulus. Indeed, Henry (1960) even showed that both reaction
time and motor time were significantly slower when motor set was enforced.
Eysenck (1982) felt deautomatization could occur in even the most taken-for-
granted skills:
"For example, if you think too deeply about the leg movements
involved in walking down a flight of stairs, you may well finish
up in a heap at the bottom of the stairs." (p.13)
Schmidt (1982) was of the same opinion with regard to more complex motor
skills. He felt that "when a person has a well-established movement program
developed over years of experience, shifting to a feedback mode places the
person in a control mode that is far less smooth and precise" (p.281). As an
[8]
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example, Schmidt suggested that asking a pianist to describe what the hands
are doing whilst playing will focus attention on the specific hand and finger
movements, causing degraded performance. Keele (1973) actually provided
evidence of this in piano playing, and Langer & Imber (1979) illustrated the
same phenomenon in typing. When the obverse of the phenomenon occurs,
that is, the pianist becomes detached from what the hands are doing,
supreme performance follows. For example, two very famous pianists were
discussing their great performances on a British chat show (Saturday Matters
with Sue Lawley, Oct, 1980). They were Victor Borge and Vladimir
Ashkenazy. Borge asked of Ashkenazy, "Has it ever frightened you to play,
and watch your fingers moving, and not know who it is that is making them
move?".
Support for this is evident in research questioning whether motor-skill
acquisition follows the Anderson (1982) progression from declarative to
procedural knowledge (Burnett, 1983). It was argued that execution of a
secondary task while batting a baseball might influence experts and non-
experts differently if batting the ball was proceduralised for experts and
declarative for non-experts. One of Burnett's findings was that experts
performed significantly better than normal in a secondary task requiring
them to recall the colour and location of ribbons on the wrist, elbow and
upper portion of the pitcher's delivery arm. In later discussing this finding
Allard & Burnett (1985) argued that "it is almost as if giving the declarative
system of experts something to keep it busy makes it easier for the
procedural system to get down to business" (p.310).
On a more conceptual basis optimum performance appears to follow from
employing one route, the more implicit one, whereas lesser performance
follows from employing the alternative, more explicit route. In terms of the
previously mentioned theories of skill acquisition, performance will degrade
if the performer reverts from procedural to declarative processing
(Anderson, 1982), automatic to controlled processing (Schneider & Fisk, 1983;
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981) autonomous to cognitive
processing (Fitts & Posner, 1967), direct retrieval to algorithmic-based
[9]
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performance (Logan, 1988) or indeed from open-loop to closed-loop type
performance (Adams, 1971; Schmidt, 1975).
1.4 Stress and skill failure
This path emerges at a problem faced by countless performers in sport. It is
the inability to cope with pressure of competition. An end product is
'choking' - the failure of normally expert skill under pressure: the double
fault in tennis when facing match point, the missed 10-inch putt in golf when
needing par. The classic example of 'choking' is the situation where the
athlete performs outstandingly in practice but poorly in competition (Leith,
1988). All coaches can name individuals, who, in practice, not competition,
are capable of knocking off Nicklaus or beating Borg. Even Freud (1922)
referred to this:
"Many acts are most successfully carried out when they are not
the object of particularly concentrated attention.., mistakes may
occur just on (those) occasions when one is most eager to be
accurate." (p.23)
That stress can result in skill failure is incontestable, but that stress brings
this about by causing a regression from automatic back to controlled
processing due to reinvestment of explicit knowledge requires more than
supposition. Again, there is little empirical evidence to be called upon. The
Bliss-Boder hypothesis, derived from the work of Bliss (1895) and Boder
(1935), says that the effect of competition is that performers consciously
monitor their performance, and more recently Baumeister (1984) has argued
that competitive pressure encourages the performer to want to do well and
hence results in a tendency to focus on the process of performance, but these
claims appear to have little empirical backing.
Relevant at a theoretical level may be concepts such as 'composition' (Neves
& Anderson, 1981) which is said to occur during the development of
automaticity, and is the chunking of "productions" to form single, direct
representations of actions. Salmoni (1989) claims that the rapidity of
[10]
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automatic performance results from this process of composition, because the
time taken to carry out a skill is proportional to the number of productions
fired. Both Anderson (1982) and Klatzky (1984) agree with this in the sense
that direct execution of procedures will be quicker than running an action
with declarative knowledge. Klatzky (1984, p.55) encapsulates this rather
well:
"The essence of heirarchical structures, whether perceptual,
motoric, or conceptual, is that many elements at one level are
nested under a single element at a higher level. The arrangement
is not arbitrary, in that elements at the lower level "go together"
in some sense to form an integrated unit or chunk. The single
element at the higher level can be conceived of as an index or
unit for all the components in the chunk. This arrangement has
some obvious economical virtues when it comes to performance;
control of the single chunking element may suffice to coordinate
the individual components."
In this context it becomes possible that stress may lead to some level of
'decomposition', that is, a partial fragmentation of the conglomerate
representation to individual or lower-order clusters of production units.
Another way to view this is that with chunking or composition comes a shift
of attentional control to higher-order nodes (Pew, 2974). Stress may involve a
regressional shift of attentional control, resulting in a return to use of lower-
order production units. The result of attempting to run the skill with these
would be slower, less fluent performance, in other words, performance more
reminiscent of the learner.
Is it possible that the general idea is exemplified in the experiences of
Jaroslav Drobny, one of the great post-war tennis players? As a Czech, he
spent many of the war years in forced labour for the Nazis, but survived and
became a naturalised Englishman. He was a great favourite with the English
public and "played in some of Wimbledon's most dramatic and emotional
matches" (Barrett, 1986, p.393). In 1953, despite three appearances in the final
at Wimbledon, he still had not taken the crown of tennis. He, and most
experts of the day, attributed this to the backhand he had acquired, without
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coaching, as a small boy in Czechoslovakia. It was most unorthodox -
definitely not to be found described in coaching manuals. 'Drob', as he was
affectionately known, decided to take some time from serious competitve
tennis in order that he might develop a technically correct, 'by-the-book'
backhand with which to at last snatch glory. Sometime later, sporting his
new, explicitly acquired backhand, he played "The Championships"
(Wimbledon to the uninitiated). He was thirty-three. The new backhand took
him through the first rounds against weak opposition, but in the final he met
Ken Rosewall, a young Australian who would go on to be regarded one of
the great players of all time. Under extreme pressure from Rosewall, Drobny
found his beautiful new backhand breaking down - he found himself
attempting again and again to operate the backhand consciously with his
explicit knowledge of it. Finally, when all seemed lost, Drob reverted to his
trusty old implicitly acquired backhand, and proceeded to snatch victory
from the jaws of defeat.
1.5 Theories relevant to the role of stress in performance
A number of models of stress and performance have been proposed.
Predominant has been the inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908),
which attempts to explain the stress/performance relationship in terms of
arousal levels. That is, an optimum level of arousal exists for all acts. Should
the performer go above or below that level, performance will deteriorate. The
implication, as is obvious from Figure 1.1, is that as the level of arousal
increases performance will improve, until a peak is reached and any further
increase leads to deterioration in performance. Arousal is regarded as a
response in which the organism is galvanised for activity (Duffy, 1962). The
activation response, in terms of neural excitation, lies on a continuum from
deep sleep to high excitement (Malmo, 1959). As will be discussed, the
unidimensionality of this definition of arousal leads to difficulty in
characterising the arousal/performance relationship. Oxendine, (1970)
popularised the inverted-U notion in sports performance with the
assumption that gross motor acts, such as boxing, weightlifting and
sprinting, requiring strength, speed and endurance need a high level of
[12]
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arousal for peak performance, whereas complex motor acts, such as archery,
golf-putting and darts, calling for steadiness and fine coordination require a
low level of arousal for optimum performance. At first glance this seems very
sensible; however, criticism has been aimed at the inverted-U hypothesis on a
number of levels. For example, the categories are too broad. Skills within
sports vary greatly. Some may call for high arousal and some low. An archer
may require a high level of arousal to draw the bow, but a low level to direct
the arrow. A tennis player may need a high level of arousal to maintain the
fierceness of his or her serve, but a low level of arousal to make a delicate
drop-volley off the return of that serve. Furthermore, the hypothesis ignores
obvious variables such as the skill level of the performer, the perceptual
characteristics of the skill and the decision-making requirements.
Arousal Level
Figure 1.1 The inverted-U performance/arousal curve.
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In an effort to clarify the link between stress and arousal Levi (1972) gave the
inverted-U hypothesis a brief lease of life by suggesting that the individual
becomes more stressed as the level of arousal moves further above or below
the optimum level. In other words, both underarousal and overarousal can
lead to increased stress, and performance will be seen to decrease as the level
of stress increases. This idea is baulked by some simple obstacles. It is the
individual's cognition of the situation that controls the level of stress (Cox,
1978; Neiss, 1988; Sanders, 1983), so low arousal, for example, is not
necessarily stressful to the person trying to sleep. Nor is overly high arousal
necessarily stressful to the boxer preparing for the brutality of the ring. In
fact, it may be seen as very positive. Another obstacle is simply that no
explanation is provided for why levels of arousal above or below the
optimum will impair performance. Weinberg (1989) tried to improvise an
explanation with Easterbrook's (1959) original idea that arousal and emotion
will influence the rate and quality of cue utilization. As arousal level
increases past the individual's optimum level the breadth of attentional
selectivity will narrow and cues relevant to successful performance will be
missed.
There are problems also with the descriptive validity of the inverted-U. For
instance, Hardy & Fazey (1987) argued that its symmetry is unwarranted.
They claimed that it is normal for overarousal in a performer to lead to a
dramatic deterioration in performance rather than a gradual decline, and
moreover, reducing the level of arousal does not, as the inverted-U curve
suggests, mean performance will merely return to normal. They pointed out
that it is with some difficulty that performance is returned to normal
following such a dramatic deterioration. Hardy & Fazey (1987) proposed an
alternative, catastrophe model, of the stress/performance relationship. This is
based on Thom's (1975) concept of catastrophe theory, developed to model
abnormalities in continuous functions - points at which the normal continuity
of the function is broken. Hardy & Fazey argued that cognitive anxiety and
physiological or autonomic arousal are the two dominant components of
stress, with cognitive anxiety determining the strength of the physiological-
arousal effect. The three-dimensional structure of the model, as seen in
[14]
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Figure 1.2, generates clear predictions. For example, the model suggests that
high physiological arousal will lead to a deterioration in performance as
cognitive anxiety increases, whereas, low physiological arousal will lead to
an improvement in performance as cognitive anxiety increases. Furthermore,
low cognitive anxiety will result in a moderately inverted-U shape
relationship between physiological arousal and performance (back face: Fig.
1.2), whereas, high cognitive anxiety will lead to a 'cusp' type performance
curve as physiological arousal increases (front face: Fig. 1.2).
Cognitive Anxiety
Figure 1.2. The catastrophe model of the relationship between stress,
autonomic arousal and performance (Hardy & Fazey, 1987).
Hardy & Fazey described what can occur in the high cognitive anxiety
condition as 'hysteresis'. Seen more clearly in Figure 1.3 the performance
curve initially parallels the inverted-U curve, in that, as physiological arousal
increases performance improves, until a peak is reached. In this case the
peak, it is argued, will occur when the performer begins to doubt his or her
ability to meet the demands of the situation. At such a point performance
[15]
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deteriorates drastically, and the original performance level can only be
recovered if the level of stress is reduced enough for the performer to regain
the upper curve. In other words, perfomance follows a different path
depending on whether physiological arousal is increasing or decreasing.
Hardy, Parfitt & Pates (1990) have provided some support for catastrophe
theory by showing what appears to be hysteresis in performance of a
basketball set shot. By manipulating physiological arousal (heart rate) under
conditions of high and low cognitive anxiety, through testing either one day
before or one day after a major basketball game, they were able to show that
performance followed a different path when heart rate was increasing from
when heart rate was decreasing under the high cognitive anxiety conditions,
but not under the low cognitive anxiety conditions. The path parallelled the
predicted hysteresis curve. A similar result was evidenced in experienced
crown green bowlers. Further to this, in both cases Hardy et al were able to
show catastrophic drops in performance under high cognitive anxiety.
Stress
Figure 1.3. Hysteresis, as predicted by the Hardy & Fazey (1987) model
under conditions of high cognitive anxiety.
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In attempting to offer a more comprehensive explanation of the
stress/performance relationship Hardy & Fazey highlighted the risk attached
to employing a 'unidimensional' approach to explain such a complex
relationship. They emphasised that arousal and anxiety are multidimensional
in nature. The idea that one general arousal system is enough to explain the
stress/performance relationship has lost considerable ground to multiple
systems models (Hamilton, 1959; Broadbent, 1971; Eysenck, 1982, 1984;
Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Sanders, 1983). For example, Hockey & Hamilton
(1983) argued that the stress/performance relationship is actually founded on
the effect of arousal on processing efficiency, rather than on performance 'per
se'. Their argument was that different stressors, such as noise, motivation,
temperature, accuracy, selectivity and short-term memory and so-on, affect
different components of performance in different ways. Upon endeavouring
to register the specific subcomponent of performance affected by a stressor
they found, for instance, that loud noise leads to increased rapidity of
information processing, bettter recall of strongly associated items and
greater attentional selectivity, but impaired recall of poorly associated items
and degraded working memory. A weakness with the research is a
discrepancy between the stressor (loud noise) and the type of performance
called for (i.e., verbal recall). Ecologically, the type of performance one
would expect to fall under such a stressor would be more likely to be a motor
task such as that required in an engineering work shop or on a work site,
rather than a verbal recall task (Adams, 1983; Parfitt, Jones & Hardy, 1990). A
classic example of research which has considered stressors more ecologically
relevant to the type of performance is the work by Baddeley (1966) in which
he considered diving performance in a pressure chamber and the sea. He
found that manual dexterity was poorer in the sea and concluded that there
are more or greater stressors in the sea. Later research showed a similar
relationship with visual search and short-term memory tasks (Lewis &
Baddeley, 1981).
Despite the drawbacks with the work of Hockey St Hamilton (1983) it has
served to initiate a slight change in direction in the use of intervention
techniques used in sport psychology when attempting to overcome problems
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thrown up by the stress/performance relationship. That is, the focus is
shifting away from emotional-control strategies, such as relaxation
techniques commonly used to reduce stress levels in the performer, towards
strategies which fall more into the information-processing domain. As an
example, Jones & Hardy (1988) suggest that to reduce working-memory
deficits performers could learn under dual-task restrictions in order that they
learn to make performance-relelvant decisions under stress. Both Guttman
(1987) and Kuhn (1987) have shown that this can work. Jones & Hardy also
suggest that in situations where a performer suffers from
hyperdistractability' due to increased selectivity associated with high
anxiety, desensitization might be employed to accustom the performer to
distractions relevant to the performing environment. Attention-control
strategies might also be employed in such a situation.
Following on from the Hockey & Hamilton ideas, Hockey, Coles & Gaillard
(1986) proposed a 'wet' model approach to the examination of the
stress/performance relationship. This approach required the model to
account for the variability in efficiency of the organism's information
processing capability under varying environmental and/or internal states. It
was argued that any model of the stress/performance relationship must
register variablity generated by state changes, such as those occurring in
behaviour under stress, or processing changes related to patterns of
biological activity in the performer, or indeed individual differences.
A multidimensional, 'wet' model relevant to the relationship between stress
and performance in sport was advanced by Sanders (1981, 1983). It suggests
that the influence stress has on performance is due to the interaction between
'energetical supply mechanisms' and cognitive processes. The structure of the
model is supplied by three neurophysiological systems identified by Pribram
& McGuiness (1975) as involved in attention control. They are an 'arousal'
system controlling physiological reponses, an 'activation' system controlling
tonic readiness to respond and an 'effort' system which coordinates the
arousal and activation systems in order to ensure that they accurately
coordinate perception with action (therefore, achieving successful decision-
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making). Such coordination is seen to require effort. According to Jones &
Hardy (1988) effort is a "coordinating mechanism in the sense that it attempts
to correct any imbalances in the basal arousal and activation mechanisms in
order to produce maximal performance" (p.53). They apply Sander's model
to a tennis player returning serve. The player has first to perceive the ball in
flight (effective perception relies on the state of arousal), then decide on the
return shot (such decision-making being influenced by effort) and finally
prepare to execute the shot (such preparation being influenced by the state of
activation). A modified version of Sander's (1983) model, proposed by Jones
& Hardy (1988) is useful in explaining some situations in sport where stress
leads to poor performance (Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4. The modifed version of Sander's (1983) model of the
stress/performance relationship (Jones & Hardy, 1988).
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The model has a valuable additional characteristic. Very high arousal can
result in an 'overflow' to the activation system, so by-passing the decision-
making system. This allows for more rapid responses in well-learned skills,
but is disadvantaged by the increased likelihood of inappropriate repsonses
due to poor decision-making. An example might be the squash player who,
too highly aroused during an important point, reacts very rapidly to the
opponent's shot but only to hit it directly back to the opponent, rather than,
with the intervention of the decision-making system, making the appropriate
decision to play the ball to the furthest part of the court from the opponent.
The Zen philosopher might use the example of a swordsman who loses his
head in the heat of the battle 3 . Perceiving an opportunity for the 'coup de grace'
the swordsman, in his haste, fails to account for his opponents sword as he
drops his guard to make the killing thrust.
Slightly less complex models were proposed by both Broadbent (1971) and
Eysenck (1982, 1984). Both distinguished between two arousal systems. On
the one hand, a passive arousal system responsive to the task demands and
the stuation, and on the other hand, a cognitive control system responsive to
the needs of the first system, and ible to provide a compensatory boost of
'effort', so to speak, when performance is less than adequate. In many ways
this approach is similar to that of Sander's, except that two rather than three
systems are required. All three models see effort as a mechanism responsible
for correcting imbalances between arousal and activation, with optimum
performance the goal.
Another theory with relevance to the stress/performance relationship is
Apter's (1982) theory of psychological reversals, as applied to sporting
contexts by Kerr (1987a,b,c, 1989). This theory is very much founded on the
'structural phenomenology' of the way an individual experiences and
responds to his or her levels of motivation. Reversal theory allows for the
existence of four pairs of 'metamotivational states' that can move or reverse in
either direction: telic-paratelic, negativism-conformity, autic-alloic and
sympathy-mastery. Of greatest interest to Kerr is the telic-paratelic pairing.
3 Pun not intended.
[20]
Relaxation	 Excitement,---
,-
.'
.'Bomdom	 Anxiety
Pleasant
Hedonic
Tone
Unpleasant
Chapter]: An Introduction
The paratelic state encompasses behaviour of a spontaneous, playful nature
preferring high arousal levels, whereas the telic state encompasses behaviour
of a serious, planning nature preferring low arousal levels. Under conditions
of high arousal reversals can occur between telic and paratelic states, and
may explain performance in some individuals claims Kerr (1985a). The
classic example being the sudden and often dramatic swings in the behaviour
of John McEnroe. Kerr argues that the telic-paratelic pair are relative to sport
because they are concerned with the individual's experience of felt arousal
and hedonic tone. Felt arousal refers to the individual's feelings of being
'worked up', whereas hedonic tone refers to the individual's experienced
pleasure. Different levels of arousal are preferred in the telic and paratelic
states. feelings associated with high or low arousal are characterised by
excitement, anxiety, boredom or relaxation. Individuals in the telic state
experience low arousal as relaxing and pleasant, but high arousal as anxiety
provoking and unpleasant. On the other hand, those in the paratelic state
experience high arousal as exciting and pleasant, but low arousal as boring
and unpleasant. Figure 1.5, borrowed from Apter (1982), illustrates this
relationship.
Low	 Felt Arousal	 High
----	 Arousal-seeking
Arousal-avoidance
Figure 1.5. The telic-paratelic relationship in Reversal Theory (Apter, 1982).
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Reversals can occur if the individual becomes frustrated and his or her needs
are not being met, or if events occur to trigger a reversal, such as a change in
the environment or in the biological readiness to perform. Reversals may also
occur when the individual reaches a satiation point, that is, where too much
time has been spent in one state. Examples, such as hang-gliding or public
speaking serve to illustrate reversals. When first performed these are
accompanied by high arousal, which is experienced as unpleasant anxiety,
but after a number of performances a telic to paratelic reversal may occur
and the unpleasant anxiety can be experienced as exhilaration or pleasant
excitement. Individuals can be predisposed towards spending more time in
one metamotivational state than the other, implying a telic or paratelic
dominance according to Murgatroyd (1985), who went as far as to develop a
Telic Dominance Scale (TDS) to measure this (Murgatroyd et al, 1978).
In terms of the stress/performance relationship it has been shown that telic
and paratelic dominant individuals can respond differently to stress (Martin,
1985; Martin et al, 1987). In particular, the theory seems to predict that
increases in the effect of stress can facilitate performance. Martin et al (1987)
compared telic dominant and paratelic dominant individuals on a video
game under stressful (your performance will be compared with the others so
do your best) and non-stressful (play for fun) conditions. It was shown that
paratelic dominant subjects performed better in the stressful as opposed to
non-stressful conditions, whereas the opposite was true for the telic
dominant subjects. Moreover, the the paratelic group performed better in the
stressful condition than the telic group did in either condition, suggesting to
Martin et al that paratelic dominance has a stress-moderating effect which
may actually provide the individual with enhanced pleasure and excitement
from performing under stress.
The complexity of the stress/performance relationship deepens when other
individual differences are considered. For instance, individual differences in
augmenting and reducing (Petrie, 1967), extraversion and introversion
(Eysenck, 1967) and sensation seeking (Zuckerman et al, 1964) have been
explained in terms of arousal-based models, such as stimulus intensity
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control (Roger & Raine, 1984). Reducers, extraverts and high sensation
seekers have been found to have a greater tolerance to high levels of stimulus
intensity than augmenters, introverts and low sensation seekers (Phillip &
Wilde, 1970; Zuckerman et al, 1966; van Knorring, 1974). In this sense,
complications must arise in theories, such as Reversal theory (Apter, 1982;
Kerr 1987a, 1989) and Catastrophe theory (Hardy & Fazey, 1987), which
predict dramatic changes in dimensions of performance as arousal levels
alter.
Another example of the complications created by the vast individual
differences literature, is the evidence that females generally exhibit higher
levels of sport specific trait anxiety than males (Martens, 1977) and that they
have also been found to report higher levels competitive state anxiety (Jones
& Cale, 1989b). Whatever the reasons for this, such differences increase the
interactive intricacies of the stress/performance relationship. One question
often addressed in this respect is concerned with the distinction between the
cognitive and somatic components of anxiety - which results in the failure of
the skill? The cognitive component is that involving conscious concern about
one's performance (worry) and interferes with cognitive performance,
whereas the somatic component (emotionality) is that involving interference
with motor performance due to physiological effects such as hand tremors
and degraded coordination (Morris, Smith, Andrews & Morris, 1975).
Although Morris & Liebert (1969) speculated that the somatic component of
anxiety would interfere with motor performance subsequent research with
typewriting skills showed no significant correlation. Instead a significant
negative correlation existed between the cognitive component and
performance. More recently, research employing the Competitive State
Anxiety Inventory (Martens, 1977) which assesses state levels of both
cognitive and somatic anxiety as a function of competition has provided
mixed evidence on the effects of each component on performance (Burton,
1988; Caruso, Dzewaltowski, Gill & McElroy, 1990; Gould, Petlichkoff,
Simons & Vevera, 1987; Parfitt & Hardy, 1987; Ussher & Hardy, 1986). One
explanation suggested by a number of researchers for this lack of agreement
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(Gould et al, 1987; Parfitt & Hardy, 1987; Ussher & Hardy, 1986) has been that
different skills may have a bias towards negative correlations with either
cognitive or somatic anxiety depending on their neuromuscular
characteristics. For example, Gould et al (1987) suggested that pistol shooting,
which they found to exhibit a negative performance versus somatic anxiety
correlation, would be more sensitive to altered physiological arousal due to
the fine neuromuscular control required for successful performance.
A number of theories have been advanced as consistent with the disparity in
results. In particular, Humphreys & Revelle (1984) proposed a model
employing dual systems (arousal and on-task effort). The model is somewhat
similar to those of Broadbent (1971), Eysenck (1982, 1984) and Sanders (1983),
in that, on-task effort is regarded as something of a compensatory control
system responsible for allocating resources. Unlike the previously mentioned
models arousal is seen as a unidimensional factor linked with alertness. The
model endeavours to predict performance on sustained information transfer
(SIT) and short-term memory (STM) tasks. Basically, SIT tasks do not call for
retention of information, whereas, STM tasks do. Humphrey & Revelle
argued that performance on SIT tasks should be improved by increases in
both on-task effort and arousal, but STM skills would degrade under high
levels of arousal. Finally, the model accepts that performance can be
influenced by somatic anxiety resulting in increased physiological arousal, or
cognitive anxiety resulting in increased on-task effort. Increased somatic
anxiety would improve performance on SIT tasks, whereas increased
cognitive anxiety would degrade performance on SIT tasks. Increased
somatic anxiety in high-trait anxious performers would degrade STM
performance more than in low-trait anxious performers. Although the model
is not directly aimed at sporting skills, and although the SIT/STM distinction
seems somewhat limited, it serves to (a) offer an explanation of findings such
as those provided by Gould et al (1987) in the area of pistol shooting and (b)
implies, as Jones & Hardy (1988) point out, that the stress/performance
relationship "...is determined by a complex interaction between the
psychological make-up of the individual, the nature of the stressor
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encountered and the cognitive requirements of the skill being performed"
(p.58).
Borkovec (1976) appears to be one of the few authors to directly suggest the
obvious possibility that cognitive and somatic anxiety are so intertwined that
one will directly influence the other. In terms of the stress/reinvestment of
controlled processing/performance relationship this would lead to the
argument that the cognitive component of anxiety interferes with cognitive
performance (leading the performer to consciously think about, and
eventually attempt to control consciously, his or her skill) and this cognitive
interference manifests itself in interference with motor performance by
decreasing muscular coordination (a symptom of somatic anxiety) due to
forcing the system to process too many commands.
Vague lateral support for this is evident in a study by Weinberg & Hunt
(1976) in which participants learned to throw a ball at a specific target.
Electromyographic recording of the electrical activity in the muscles during
this task showed that the muscular activity of trait-anxious participants was
less efficient than in non-anxious participants. The authors suggested in
explanation that trait-anxious individuals may be more likely to 'cortically
steer' and control the movement they are making.
Such a 'reinvestment' of controlled processing in automatic skill may explain
choking, and indeed, may explain more severe forms of choking, such as
'dartitis' or the feared 'yips' 4 . That is, under pressure, the individual begins
thinking about how he or she is executing the skill, and endeavours to
operate it with his or her explicit knowledge of its mechanics. Indeed, it
would appear that Zhivago is correct - the beam of consciousness turns
inwards and a catastrophe occurrs.
4 'Dartitis' is an affliction occasionally suffered by darts players which causes great
difficulty in releasing the dart smoothly from the fingers at the end of the throwing
movement. The 'yips' are similar in that they are an affliction suffered by golfers causing
extreme difficulty in making a smooth strike of the ball during putting.
[25]
TY
r (IRK
LIBRARY
Chapter 1: An Introduction
1.6 The thesis structure
The studies which follow explore issues arising from the prior discussion.
Study 1 is launched from the premise that failure of expert motor skill is
common in cases where performers are highly motivated to succeed and that
one cause of this can be an inward focus of attention in which an attempt is
made to perform the skill by consciously processing explicit knowledge of
how it works. The resulting disruption of the automaticity of the skill leads
to its failure. It follows from this that disruption of automatic processing will
be avoided if performers have little or no explicit knowledge of their skill.
Subjects in the reported experiment were required to acquire a golf-putting
skill, either explicitly (with knowledge of rules) or implicitly (without
knowledge of rules) and were then tested under conditions of stress,
induced by a combination of evaluation apprehension and financial
inducement. Evidence was found to partially support the hypothesis that the
skill of performers with a small pool of explicit knowledge is less likely to
fail under pressure than that of performers with a large pool of explicit
knowledge.
Study 2 tacks slightly from the debate in Chapter 1 in order to solve a
problem which only became apparent following on Study Z. When
manipulating the acquisition of a motor skill in order to bring about
implicit learning the performer is asked to learn a primary task while at the
same time carrying out a secondary task. The purpose is to restrict the
amount of explicit knowledge the performer adds to any existing
knowledge about the primary task. The aim of the investigation was to
explore whether surges in performance seen upon withdrawal of the
secondary task in the implicit learning condition were due to the lifting of
an embargo on processing resources or to a 'reminiscence' phenomenon
resulting from a rest period following massed practice of the primary task.
Two implicit learning groups and two discovery learning (control) groups
performed a golf-putting skill under either massed or spaced practice
conditions. While the massed implicit learning condition depressed
performance (although not significantly more than the spaced implicit
[26]
Chapter]: An Introduction
learning condition), no reminiscence effect was seen in either condition
upon suspension of the secondary task. It was concluded that an easing of
demands on processing resources, not a reminiscence effect, is responsible
for post-secondary task surges in performance which may occur following
suspension of secondary task restrictions during implicit learning.
Study's 3, 4, 5 and 6 explore the idea that 'reinvestment' of controlled
processing may be a dimension of personality. In Study 3 it was
hypothesised that individuals may have a predisposition towards
'reinvestment' of controlled processing, which will lead to skill failure under
stress as a result of disruption of the automatic functioning of the skill.
Factor analysis of a number of established personality measures related to
the concept of reinvestment uncovered a reliable 20-item factor which
appeared to be associated with reinvestment. In the fourth study a predictive
validation of this 'Reinvestment Scale' was attempted. It was predicted that
the motor performance of high scorers on the scale would be more likely to
fail under pressure than that of low scorers, on the grounds that high
reinvesters would be more likely to disrupt the smooth functioning of their
own skill by investing it with controlled processing. High and low
reinvesters learned a two-dimensional rod tracing task to a level of
performance approaching asymptote and were then required to perform
under conditions of stress. Despite highly significant increases irt the 2evels
of stress exhibited, performance was unaffected in both groups, thus
providing neither support for nor refutation of the prediction. An
explanation of this was that the rod tracing task was not complex enough to
present the kind of demands that would lead to reinvestment. Hence, a fifth
study was carried out in which a more complex, golf-putting skill was
considered. In this instance support was found for the prediction that the
performance of high scorers on the Reinvestment Scale would be more likely
to fail under pressure than that of low scorers. Finally, a sixth study was
carried out in which further validation was sought by exploring whether a
relationship existed between the reinvestment scores of university team
squash and tennis players and the opinion of informed raters on their
tendency to 'choke' under pressure. A strong relationship was found,
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providing further evidence that high reinvesters are more likely to suffer
from performance breakdown under pressure. It was concluded that the
Reinvestment Scale does indeed assess a predisposition towards
reinvestment of controlled processing, and may prove to be a valuable
instrument in predicting skill failure in stressful situations involving
complex, rule-bound skills.
Finally, in Chapter 5 issues and findings emanating from this research are
discussed in the context of acquisition of skill, attainment of expertise and
avoidance of skill failure, along with some debate on the possibilities for
future investigation, and perhaps most importantly, insight into the practical
implications and applications of the research.
[28]
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The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the
breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure*
2.1 An introduction to Study 1
The experiment to be described will test the proposition that disruption of
the automaticity of a skill under pressure may be avoided if explicit
knowledge of that skill is restricted; that is, should a performer have no pool
of knowledge to consciously call upon when performing a relatively
automatic skill then attempts to consciously run the skill would be expected
to fail. In a sense the aim here is to block the path from procedural back to
declarative processing, in Anderson's (1982) terms, or automatic back to
controlled processing, in Schneider & Shiffrin's (1977) terms, or direct
retrieval back to algorithmic processing, in Logan's 19881 terms, or even
open-loop back to feedback-based performance, in the term's of Adams
(1971) or Schmidt (1975).
The experiment will employ two phases. In the initial phase, individuals will
acquire the complex motor skill of golf putting, either explicitly, through
specific written instruction on how to putt, or implicitly, through a dual-task
method (Baddeley, 1966) in which constant verbal generation of random
letters at a specific rate is required whilst learning to putt. The rationale
behind this is that the secondary task is a resource-limiting device which will
place such demands on short-term memory capacity that accretion of explicit
* Based on Masters, R.S.W. (1992). Knowledge, knerves and know-how: The role of explicit
versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure.
British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343-358.
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putting-skill knowledge will be virtually nil. A variety of control conditions
will also be run.
This generates a strong prediction that individuals receiving written
instructions will have a greater pool of explicit knowledge than those not
receiving written instructions. A more instructive prediction is that
individuals learning implicitly will have a smaller pool of explicit
knowledge than those learning for themselves, that is, by discovery.
In the second phase, the differently acquired putting skills will be tested
under conditions of stress. Stress is to be induced using Cottrell's (1972)
evaluation apprehension paradigm, which posits that apprehension will
arise in situations where there is anticipation of positive or negative
outcomes contingent on evaluation by an audience. Anticipation of a
negative outcome will be caused in the present experiment by emphasising
that the evaluator (a supposed golf professional) will have instructions to
reduce payments should performance be poor. A point favouring the use of
evaluation apprehension in this way is that the presence of an audience has
been argued to induce a self-attentive state in which attempts are made to
conform with correct standards of performance (Wicklund & Duval, 1971;
Carver & Scheier, 1981). In other words, reinvestment of controlled
processing is more likely to take place in an effort to modify performance
with one's explicit knowledge of how it should be executed.
A number of checks will be made on whether apprehension does arise. The
state scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al, 1970) will
be administered under stressed and unstressed conditions, thus yielding a
repeated measures view of each subject's apprehension. Heart rate will also
be monitored under stressed and unstressed conditions, yielding a second
indication of the effects of stress. The state-anxiety scale assesses immediate
feelings of worry, tension, apprehension and nervousness. Heart rate reflects
the physiological response to such state anxiety. One further check will be
made on whether evaluation apprehension has been successfully induced.
The time taken to complete each putting session will be recorded. According
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to Zajonc (1972) and Innes & Young (1975), if the subject endeavours to gain
the maximum positive outcome from an evaluative situation in which he or
she has been asked to work on a complex task as errorlessly as possible, then
performance will slow down in order to minimize errors. In a meta-analysis
of some 241 studies, Bond & Titus (1983) agreed that, in the presence of
others, complex tasks "seem to be performed more slowly" (p.282). In the
present case, subjects will be required to hole as many putts as possible out
of one-hundred attempts during each session; in other words, to perform as
errorlessly as possible. It is therefore hypothesised that, given the absence of
time constraints, apprehension will be indicated by slower performance.
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), devised by Broadbent et at
(1982) to assess the tendency to have 'slips of action', will be administered.
The result of such slips is "a departure from the normal smooth flow of
function, and events do not proceed in accordance with intention"
(Broadbent et al, 1982, p.1). This would appear to relate to the breakdown of
motor skills in that the reinvestment of conscious processing may cause
events not to proceed "in accordance with intention". In addition, Broadbent
et al argued that a high CFQ score may reflect a high 'vulnerability' to stress.
They felt this to be reasonable "in terms of the view that stress has its major
effects on those who cannot cope cognitively" (p.13). A similar view is held
by Reason & Mycielska (1982). They say that "the tendency to make a lot of
these errors in all circumstances suggests that the person in question lacks
some degree of resistance to stressful situations which is not shared by those
who are less error-prone" (p.36). The question surfacing in the present
context is, will such vulnerability to stress manifest itself in failure of skill?
That is, will a high CFQ score predict a high likelihood of skill breakdown
under conditions of stress, and, vice versa, will a low CFQ score predict a low
likelihood of breakdown.
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2.2 Method
Subjects
Forty paid volunteers, novice to golf putting, were randomly assigned' to
one of five conditions: implicit learning (IL), explicit learning (EL), implicit
learning control (ILC), stressed control (SC) and non-stressed control (N-SC).
Each group consisted of 8 subjects. Ages ranged from 18 to 46 years (M =
27.22).
Apparatus
Standard 'Ping' golf putters were used by all subjects. These were 35 in. (88.9
cm) in length with standard angle of lie and loft for a Ping 'Anser' putter.
White 'Ping Eye' golf balls of standard dimensions (size 1.68 in. [4.27 cm])
were used by all subjects. Putts were made from a distance of 150 cm at a
hole 10.8 cm in diameter (the size enforced by the United States Professional
Golf Association [PGAD. Task difficulty was increased by requiring putts to
be struck up a shallow incline (1:4). The putting surface was green, short-
tufted artificial grass of the type known as 'astro-turf'.
Heart rate was monitored by means of a computerised finger attachment
system, which produced a continuous plot for 180 s. An electronic
metronome was used to emit 'clicks' at regular 1.5 s or 1.0 s intervals in the
secondary task condition.
Design
The experiment had two distinct phases: a skill acquisition phase followed
by a test phase. In the skill acquisition phase, taking place over four sessions
of 100 putts, subjects acquired the complex motor skill of golf putting
implicitly, explicitly or in one of the three control conditions. In the test
1 It was not possible to pre-test and match subjects on initial skill level for reasons to be
discussed in the results section.
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phase, taking place over one session of 100 putts, subjects in the IL, EL and
SC conditions, were subjected to stress while they performed, whereas those
in the ILC and N-SC conditions were not subjected to stress while they
performed.
Procedure
At the beginning of each session subjects, who participated individually,
were required to sit quietly for a period of 5 min. to allow their heart rates to
return to base line. The five sessions took place on consecutive days at the
same time. In each session subjects made two sets of 50 putts separated by
an inter-trial interval of between five and seven min. A globai performalke
measure - the number of putts entering the hole - was used as the dependent
variable.
No time constraints were imposed on subjects. The total time taken to
complete the two sets of 50 putts (task-completion time) was recorded each
day in order to provide information regarding the expected slowing of
performance of the stressed groups in the test phase. The state scale of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) was presented in the inter-trial interval
of the third and fifth sessions, while the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
(CFQ) was presented in the inter-trial interval of the second session.
All subjects were required to read a standard statement explaining that they
would earn E12.00, and requesting that they not think about, rehearse or
practice putting while away from the experiment.
Additional instructions, tailored to each condition, were also given. In the EL
condition a set of very specific instructions on how to putt a golf ball were
presented [see Appendix 1]. These were extracted from two reputable
coaching sources (Saunders & Clark, 1977; Stirling, 1985), and presented in
each of the first four sessions during the 5 min resting phase prior to heart
rate measurement. It was impressed upon subjects that they should read
these carefully and follow them as specifically as possible.
[32]
Chapter 2: Explicit versus implicit knowledge in skill breakdown under pressure
In the IL and ILC conditions, subjects received no instruction on how to putt,
but were required to carry out Baddeley's (1966) random letter generation
task in parallel with the putting task. The instructions, borrowed, almost
verbatim, from Baddeley's (1966) experiment, required subjects to call out a
random letter each time an electronic metronome 'clicked' [see Appendix 2].
In the two initial sessions, clicks sounded every 1.5 s. In the two latter
sessions, clicks sounded every 1 s. It was hoped that by maintaining the
difficulty of the secondary task in this way suppression of explicit
knowledge would continue throughout the four sessions. Inter-click
intervals of 1.5 and 1 s were too short to afford subjects the opportunity to
divert attention away from random letter generation to the putting task. It
was impressed upon subjects in both groups that they must not stop
generating random letters at any stage of the putting session, and they must
give priority to maintaining the randomness of the letters at all times.
Immediately prior to the first session they received one minute of practice at
this task. They were required to reread the instructions each day during the
5 min. rest period prior to heart rate measurement. The two groups differed
in that the IL group was placed under stress during the final session whereas
the ILC group was not.
Subjects did not receive putting instructions in either the SC or N-SC
condition, nor did they carry out a secondary task while putting. The only
proviso was that they improve as much as possible. These groups differed in
that the SC group was placed under stress during the final session whereas
the N-SC group was not.
In the fifth and final session the EL, IL and SC groups were placed in a
stressful situation involving a combination of evaluation apprehension and
financial inducement. Subjects in the EL condition were not required to
reread the putting instructions, while those in the IL and ILC conditions
were not required to carry out the secondary task. As in the previous four
sessions, subjects sat quietly for 5 min. prior to heart rate measurement;
however, during the middle 60 s phase of the 180 s monitoring period they
were required to read a standard statement [see Appendix 3] explaining that
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the original payment of £12.00 could increase to £15.00 or decrease to as little
as £1.00, depending on evaluation of their performance by an expert in golf.
The suggestion that the sum of £12.00 could increase to E15.00 was
introduced as a defensive measure against subjects feeling they had
performed so poorly that they might as well make no further effort. It was
felt that motivation to perform well would remain high if subjects believed
they could win back money they lost. Ten seconds after presentation of the
statement the evaluator arrived and was introduced to the subject before
going behind a one-way mirror. To emphasize the evaluator's status as an
expert he wore a golf pull-over and it was mentioned, quite erroneously, by
the experimenter, that some years earlier he had played the British Open at
St Andrews. As heart rate was still being monitored, it was possible to obtain
an indication of the subject's physiological response to the prospect of such
evaluation, and to the threat of losing almost all of the £12.00. This was done
by comparing the initial 60 s of the 180 s monitoring period with the final 60
s. A significant increase in heart rate was accepted as indicating an increase
in apprehension. The final session of 100 putts then began. In an effort to
maintain the level of apprehension in the three stressed conditions, the
evaluator was heard to cough at irregular intervals throughout the session.
This coughing was prerecorded. Once the evaluator had retreated behind the
one-way mirror he was free to leave by a hidden exit. In reality, no
evaluation was made; all subjects received a lump payment of twelve
pounds. Neither the ILC group nor the N-SC group was placed under stress.
The ILC group was run to determine whether any change in the performance
of the IL group in the fifth session was due to stress or to dispensation with
the secondary task. Hence, in the fifth session, this group performed the
putting task without the secondary task and without stress. Any difference
between the two implicit groups could then be compared. The N-SC group
was unstressed in order to determine whether performance continued to
improve in Session 5 or reached asymptote.
On completion of the final session, subjects were required to write down all
the factors they had become aware of over the five sessions, which they felt
were important in hitting a perfect putt. In this admittedly primitive way the
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degree of explicit knowledge available to each subject was elicited. These
written verbal protocols were scored by summing the number of explicit
rules each subject wrote down. An explicit rule was understood to be any
rule drawn from the explicit written instructions received or specifically
relating to the technical and mechanical aspects of holing a putt. For
instance, "I placed the ball in line with the inside of my left ankle" or "I
pointed my left index finger down the shaft at the ball" would be classed
explicit rules. Statements not referring to the technical and mechanical
aspects of putting, such as, "I did it by feel", were excluded.
2.3 Results
Analysis Strategy
The main measures were analysed using analyses of variance, supported by
analysis of simple main effects in instances of an interaction, Tukey's tests of
honestly significant difference and orthogonal contrasting of a priori
predictions. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were also
computed where appropriate. Initially, the verbal protocols were considered
to determine whether accretion and suppression of explicit knowledge were
successful. Analysis of state-anxiety scores, heart rate and task-completion
times followed, to determine the success of the stress intervention condition.
Once this was established, the skill acquisition phase was analysed with
regard to trends in the learning curves, which linked directly with analysis
of performance changes in the test phase. Finally, it was asked if the
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire would predict vulnerability to skill
breakdown under pressure.
[35]
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Verbal Protocols: Did the different conditions result in different degrees of explicit
knowledge?
The verbal protocols were scored by counting the number of explicit rules
written down by each subject. Figure 2.1 illustrates these in the form of a bar
chart.
IL
	
EL
	
1LC SC N-SC
Groups
Figure 2.1. Mean number of explicit rules reported in the Implicit Learning (IL),
Explicit Learning (EL), Implicit Learning Control (ILC), Stressed Control (SC) and
Non-stressed Control (N-SC) groups
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It was predicted that as the EL group's pool of knowledge was artificially
enlarged by explicit instructions during learning, it would have a greater
number of explicit rules than any other group. It was also predicted that due
to the implicit nature of their learning the IL and ILC groups would have a
smaller pool of explicit knowledge than the SC and N-SC groups, despite the
fact that the SC and N-SC groups received no explicit instruction. One-way
analysis of variance showed a highly significant main effect of the five
learning conditions [F(4,35) = 10.24, p < .0011. Two orthogonal contrasts
tested the specific predictions. Firstly, the EL group proved to have a
significantly larger pool of explicit knowledge than the IL, ILC, SC and N-SC
groups combined [T(35) = 5.60, p < .0011. Secondly, the IL and ILC groups
combined held a pool of explicit knowledge far smaller than the SC or N-SC
groups combined [T(35) = 3.08, p = .004]. These findings show that the
different conditions were effective in controlling accretion of explicit
knowledge during learning.
Test Phase: Was the stress intervention effective?
Two-way analyses of variance with repeated measures were carried out on
each measure of anxiety level, followed by analysis of simple main effects in
instances where a significant interaction occurred and on occasions where it
seemed warranted (Howell, 1982). It was expected that the three stressed
groups would exhibit greater increases in anxiety level than the two
unstressed groups.
State Anxiety. Figure 2.2 displays the mean State Anxiety Inventory scores in
Sessions 3 and 5 (pre- and post-stress intervention). A highly significant
main effect was found over sessions [F(1,35) = 15.32, p < .001], but not
groups. No significant interaction was evident [F(4,35) = 2.05, p = .108].
Normally, this lack of a significant interaction would prohibit further
analysis; however, given the graphic impression that a substantial state
anxiety increase occurred from Session 3 to Session 5 in only the three
stressed groups, analysis of simple main effects was carried out. Highly
significant increases were found in the three stressed groups - IL, EL and SC
[37]
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- [F(1,35) = 7.57, p < .01, F(1,35) = 7.84, p < .01 and F(1,35) = 7.57, p < .01
respectively], but not in the unstressed groups - ILC, N-SC - [p > .05].
	 
Implicit
-0- Explicit
-4- Implicit Control
-0- Stressed Control
-• Non-stressed Control
Sessions
Figure 2.2. Mean State Anxiety scores in Sessions 3 and 5 [Stressed groups have
clear markers and unstressed groups filled markers]
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Heart Rate. Mean heart rates pre- and post-stress intervention in Session 5 are
available in Table 2.1. A highly significant main effect of pre- versus post-
stress intervention was found [F(1,35) = 22.05, p < .0011. Again, no
interaction or main effect of groups was evident. For reasons identical to
those in the state anxiety analysis analysis of simple main effects was again
carried out despite the lack of a significant interaction. Heart rate increased
significantly from pre- to post-stress in all three stressed groups: EL [F(1,35)
= 7.14, p < .05], IL [F(1,35) = 12.84, p <.011 and SC [F(1,35) = 10.29, p < .01],
whereas the unstressed groups (ILC and N-SC) showed no significant
increase [p > .05].
Stress Intervention
Group Pre- Post-
Implicit 79.0 (13.0) 83.4 (13.2)
Explicit 81.4 (16.2) 84.7 (14.8)
Implicit Control 81.9 (9.9) 83.1 (9.3)
Stressed Control 81.8 (12.3) 85.7 (11.5)
Non-stressed Control 74.6 (11.5) 74.6 (10.9)
Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of heart rate (beats per
minute) in groups pre- and post-stress intervention in Session 5
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Task-Completion Times. Table 2.2 displays the mean time taken to complete
the 100-putt task in Session 4 and in Session 5 (pre- and post-stress
intervention). A highly significant main effect of sessions was apparent
[F(1,35) = 8.51, p = .0061. The conditions by sessions interaction was also
significant [F(4,35) = 3.05, p = .0291.
Sessions
Group 4 5
Implicit 396 (96.6) 456 (103)
Explicit 471 (134) 490 (129)
Implicit Control 404 (99.3) 393 (92.9)
Stressed Control 409 (88.8) 456 (123)
Non-stressed Control 385 (70.5) 385 (69.2)
Table 2.2. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of task-completion times
(seconds) in groups in Sessions 4 and 5
Analysis of simple main effects showed highly significant differences for
only the IL and SC groups over sessions [F(1,35) = 11.70, p < .01 and
F(1,35) = 7.33, p <.05 respectively].
It is clear from the three measures of anxiety that the stress intervention was
effective. The stressed groups (IL, EL and SC) all experienced some degree of
performance anxiety while performing during Session 5, whereas the
unstressed groups (ILC and N-SC) did not.
[40]
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Performance
Figure 2.3 displays the mean number of successful putts of each of the five
groups over the five sessions. Split-plot analysis of variance (5 x 5: groups x
sessions) revealed a highly significant main effect of sessions [F(4,140) =
36.66, p <.0011 and groups [F(4,35) = 6.49, p = .003 A significant groups x
sessions interaction [F(16,140) = 1.86, p = .029] was also found.
Sessions
Figure 2.3. Mean number of putts holed as a function of the skill acquisition phase
(Sessions 1 to 4) and the test phase (Session 5) [Stressed groups have clear markers
and unstressed groups filled markers]
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Analysis of simple main effects determined highly significant differences
between groups in all sessions [p < .01]. Highly significant differences were
also determined between sessions in all five groups [p < .011. Following this,
performances in the skill acquisition phase (Sessions 1 to 4) and the test
phase (Session 5) were explored separately.
The Skill Acquisition Phase: Performance curves
An unavoidable difficulty in the design of the experiment was the
implausibility of matching subjects on the basis of skill level. The need to
ensure that neither implicit learning group had an opportunity to acquire
explicit knowledge at any stage prohibited pre-testing. Involvement in a pre-
test would have required these groups to forego the secondary task, thus
lifting the embargo on short-term memory resources and providing an
opportunity for accretion of explicit knowledge. As is normal in such cases,
subjects were randomly assigned to conditions on the assumption that skill
level would be equal across groups. In order to produce evidence that the
groups were, indeed, matched, a one-way analysis of variance was carried
out on the mean number of putts holed in the first five putts of Session 1 by
each group. Little in the way of skill acquisition was expected over as few as
five putts, and, indeed, no significant differences were found between the
groups [F(4,35) = 1.50, p = .22212.
The general picture for the acquisition phase was that the two implicit
groups, which learned under the dual-task burden, performed less well than
the other three groups. However, the differences were not reliable in every
case when Tukey's Test of honestly significant difference was employed to
make a posteriori comparisons between groups in each of the first four
sessions. In Session 1 the ILC group scored significantly worse than the SC
group [p < .051 and N-SC group [p < .051. In Session 2 the ILC group scored
significantly worse than the SC group only [p < .051. In Session 3 both the IL
2 Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of putts holed in the first five attempts in
Session 1 were 1.0 (1.07), 1.0 (.54), .25 (.46), 1.5 (.93) and 1.13 (1.73) for the Implicit Learning,
Explicit Learning, Implicit Learning Control, Stressed Control and Non-stressed Control
groups respectively.
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and ILC groups scored significantly worse than the EL and SC groups
[p < .05], while in Session 4 the ILC group scored significantly worse than all
groups other than the IL group, which in turn scored significantly worse
than the SC group [p < .05].
The Test Phase: Performance under stress
Figure 2.3 seems to illustrate some distinct performance changes in the test
phase. Analyses were performed on Session 4 to Session 5 differences
between groups, rather than the differences between groups on Session 5
alone (as performance levels differed markedly at Session 4). The
comparisons to be made entailed a priori predictions encapsulated in four
orthogonal contrasts. Firstly, the performance change of the IL group
(stressed) was predicted to be no different from that of the ILC group
(unstressed); secondly, these two groups together were predicted not to
differ from the N-SC group. Thirdly, it was predicted that under stress the
performance change of the EL group would be similar to that of the SC
group (both having a fairly large pool of explicit knowledge); and fourthly,
these groups would differ from the combined IL, ILC and N-SC groups -
with the former exhibiting degradation of performance. The first three
predictions are for null effects, and so must be judged against the fourth
prediction. It would be inappropriate to make claims on behalf of these
predictions if the fourth prediction proved non-significant, as non-
significance would show that, in fact, no effect of treatments occurred. As
predicted, there was no difference between the IL and ILC groups [T(35) =
.24, p = .808], both of which showed a substantial increment in performance.
If the putting skill of the IL group had been affected by stress it would not
have exhibited an improvement in performance identical with that of the
ILC - its unstressed counterpart. Furthermore, the IL and ILC group
differences were not significantly different from the N-SC group [T(35) = .36,
p = .721]. Markedly similar gradients were exhibited by all three. This
suggests both implicit learning groups improved over Session 5 when not
required to carry out the secondary task (regardless of the fact that one
group was under stress and the other not). The EL group performance
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decrement was not different from that of the SC group [T(35) = .11, p .914],
but the performance decrement of these groups was significantly different
from the performance increment of the IL, ILC and N-SC groups [T(35) =
3.63, p = .001]. The continued improvement of the N-SC group, which acted
as a control for both the SC and the EL groups, shows the degraded
performance of these groups was not associated with reaching a ceiling in
performance. However, despite the apparent degradation of performance in
the EL and SC groups, Tukey's HSD test showed that the stress intervention
did not result in significant deficits in either group from Session 4 to Session
5 (p > .05). Despite the significant differences shown by orthogonal
contrasting, and in particular, the very obvious contrast between the stressed
control group (SC) and it's unstressed counterpart (N-SC), which continued
to improve, it must be emphasised that these results represent trends rather
than statistically significant effects.
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire: Does CFQ score predict likelihood of
breakdown?
Mean CFQ scores were 42.5, 45, 46.13, 46.25 and 43.88 for the IL, EL, ILC, SC
and N-SC groups respectively. One-way analysis of variance showed no
significant differences whatsoever between the five groups [F(4,35) = .21,
p = .931].
A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed between the CFQ scores and
the change in performance in the SC group. This explored whether the CFQ
could predict the tendency to break down under stress. The SC was the only
stressed group that did not receive external manipulation which might have
biased its ability to cope with stress. The correlation neared significance
(r = .60, p = .057).
2.4 Discussion
This experiment was devised as a means of testing the hypothesis that
disruption of the automaticity of a skill under pressure will be less likely if
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the skill has been learned implicitly (without knowledge of rules) rather than
explicitly (with knowledge of rules).
The experiment produced evidence which can be seen to marginally support
the hypothesis. Clear support is not available, due to the lack of a statistically
significant decrease in performance in the explicit learning and stressed
control groups. In Session 5 the implicit learning group (whose performance
did not differ significantly, in Session 4 prior to stress intervention, from that
of the explicit learning group) showed no degradation of performance under
stress whatsoever, in contrast to the explicit learning group, which, as
already mentioned, showed only a non-significant decrease in performance.
Verbal protocols collected from all subjects showed the implicit learning
groups had far less knowledge of the 'rules for execution' available for
conscious processing than the explicit learning group or, indeed, the stressed
and unstressed control groups. The presence of explicit knowledge in these
particular (discovery learning) control groups provides support for the Berry
& Broadbent (1988) opinion that individuals can employ an explicit mode of
learning even when there is an absence of explicit instruction.
The experiment has also shown it is quite possible to manipulate accretion of
explicit knowledge when acquiring new motor skills. Baddeley's (1966)
random letter generation task proved an adept suppressor of explicit
knowledge, and the explicit putting instructions successfully parallelled
common coaching mechanisms.
The success of the stress intervention was obviously of major importance in
this experiment. It is unlikely that the stress levels were a perfect ecological
match of those in real-world performance; however, with the amalgamation
of evaluation apprehension, financial inducement, and the experimental
situation itself, it was hoped to furnish a plausible facsimile. The non-
significance of the trend towards a decrease in performance in the explicit
learning and stressed control groups shows the facsimile fell short.
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As the implicit learning groups were carrying out two tasks it is
understandable that they generally performed at a lower level than the other
groups during the acquisition phase. Nevertheless, Figure 2.3 seems to show
the putting performance of both implicit groups improving. It is possible,
however, that the learning curves are an artefact of learning the secondary
task rather than the primary, putting task. As performance on the secondary
task improved, its demands on processing capacity would have diminished,
so easing depression of putting skill and giving the impression that the skill
itself was improving. Clearly, it can be argued that if putting performance
remained worse than its pre-test level, acquisition of putting skill was not
taking place. For reasons already mentioned in the results section, no pre-test
level was available for comparison. In solution, as the performance of the
stressed control and non-stressed control groups was not manipulated in any
way, their mean level of performance during the first five putts in Session 1
was taken as a pre-test performance base line for all groups. Expressed as a
percentage, the 'assumed' pre-test level was 26.25%. The performance of the
implicit groups in Session 4 surpassed the assumed pre-test level of 26.25 %,
confirming that putting-skill acquisition did, in fact, occur.
In Session 1 the explicit learning group exhibits a performance level almost
as low as the implicit learning groups. It seems reasonable to account for this
in terms of the demands of processing written instructions on how to putt.
This was clearly a less resource-limiting secondary task than random letter
generation, but nevertheless, more limiting than putting alone. The dramatic
improvement in the explicit learning group's performance from Session 1 to
Session 2 may simply be a return to baseline performance, allowed by a
rapid adjustment to carrying out such a simple secondary task. In some
respects this is supported by the similarity of the explicit learning, stressed
control and non-stressed control performance curves for the rest of the skill
acquisition phase. Studies comparing discovery learning with instructed
learning often show similar trends in the learning curves (den Brinker & van
Hekken, 1982; Whiting et al, 1987; Vereijken & Whiting, 1990). An alternative
way of explaining the dramatic improvement of the explicit learning group
from Session 1 to Session 2, can be drawn from discussion of computational
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theories of motor learning and control. Whiting & den Brinker (1982)
distinguished between the 'image of the act' and the 'image of achievement'
in developing a general motor programme of performance. The image of the
act defines the movement and coordination patterns required to execute the
skill, while the image of achievement defines the external, environmental
forces to be overcome. The novice performer must form both images if the
task is to be completed satisfactorily, but Whiting & den Brinker suggested
this is initially very difficult, as attention to either image will be at the
expense of the other. It could be argued that in the present experiment
written instructions in the explicit learning condition supplied subjects with
a prefabricated coordination pattern with which to form an image of the act.
Formation of the image of the act would therefore have demanded less
attention at the expense of the image of achievement.
The very low degree of explicit knowledge held by the two implicit groups
shows that despite the diminished demands of the secondary task on
processing capacity, suppression of explicit knowledge still occurred. Had
the acquisition phase perhaps continued for another five sessions, actual
putting performance in the implicit learning groups may have shown
considerable improvement, due to the easing of secondary task restrictions
on putting skill acquisition. A wary eye would need to be kept on the extent
to which accretion of explicit knowledge increased. However, if, as seems to
be indicated, the embargo continued, the outcome of such additional
learning would raise some interesting questions. For instance, would the
skill remain or become even more strongly insulated against reinvestment of
controlled processing under stress? Or, in terms of 'rehearsal', the tendency
to rehearse emotional events (Roger & Nesshoever, 1987), would the lack of
explicit knowledge mean there was less to rehearse, and hence, less
distraction when performing, or more processing capacity available for
rehearsal of potentially distracting information?
There is also a disparity between mean accuracy at Session 4 in this
experiment and the mean accuracy of individuals who can be said to have
fully automatic putting skills. For example, Cockerill (1975) gave figures for
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seven low handicap golfers (mean handicap = 6) putting from 150 cm on an
artificial putting surface, which showed they had a 78 % success rate, as
opposed to 42 % in the present experiment (although the uphill gradient of
1:4 did make the present putting task more difficult). The performance of the
non-stressed control group was still improving in Session 5, which suggests
the performance of the remaining groups was not fully automatic at Session
4. After all, only 400 putts had been made at the Session 4 stage - clearly too
few to have attained automaticity of skill, if one agrees with Hammond
(1987) that even 10 years of diligence may not be enough to achieve
expertise. Nevertheless, the mere repetition of a skill in a consistent task
environment is regarded as enough to warrant the development of some
degree of automaticity (Logan, 1978, 1988; Schneider & Fisk, 1982; Schneider
& Shiffrin, 1977), so the hypothesis that a reinvestment of conscious
processing will disrupt automatic processing of the skill was valid.
There was a hint that the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent et al,
1982) might predict failure of skill under stress. The questionnaire assesses
the tendency to have slips of action. If such slips are the result of an inherent
flaw in automatic processing, it may be that disruption of automatic
processing of skill under pressure is the result of the same flaw. Only a small
number of subjects (n = 8) were eligible for the correlation between
performance change under stress and CFQ score, so this question warrants
further study.
In general terms, the results draw critical attention to long accepted methods
of coaching, particularly the somewhat 'hit and hope' identification of
potentially elite performers, followed by an earnest attempt to nurture them
through to world class standards of performance with prolonged, explicit
instruction in how to execute the skills of the sport. It is the contention of the
author that such prolonged, explicit instruction can increase the chance that
the skill of the potentially elite performer will not withstand the pressure
accompanying performance in the world arena.
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Reminiscing about implicit learning
3.1 An introduction to Study 2
Study 1 showed that performance of a skill did not deteriorate under stress
when the skill had been learned implicitly, that is, without accretion of
explicit, verbalisable knowledge of the skill itself. A problem faced,
however, when researching the effect of implicit motor-skill learning is that
the only documented means of invoking implicit acquisition of skill is
through enforcing secondary task restrictions on the learner. The basis of
such restrictions is that dual-task methods such as Baddeley's (1966)
random letter generation task are resource-limiting devices which can
impede an individual's ability to consciously process what they are doing,
and thereby prohibit accumulation of knowledge explicitly. As no other
study has endeavoured to use such methods to investigate the implicit
acquisition of motor skill teething problems are bound to occur.
A major problem signalled by Study 1 is that apparent improvement in
performance of implicitly learned motor skill over time does not guarantee
the skill is being learned. Initially, the secondary task may only depress the
existing level of motor-skill performance, but as a result of acclimatisation
to dual-task conditions its resource-limiting efficiency may lessen, so easing
depression of performance by allowing increased resources to be directed to
the motor skill. In such circumstances the increase in performance level may
give a false impression of the amount of learning that has taken place. This
would call into question the finding that an implicitly learned motor skill is
less likely to fail under pressure than a motor skill learned either explicitly
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or by 'discovery' (that is, with no manipulation of knowledge accretion).
Although not entirely convincing the study did confirm that learning took
place by illustrating that performance after 400 trials was superior to the
initial skill levell
Performance by the implicit learning groups in the study was depressed in
contrast to that of the discovery learning groups. Furthermore, a surge in
performance was seen in the unstressed implicit learning group following
withdrawal of the secondary task load. It would appear that relaxing the
demand on processing capacity allowed more resources to be diverted to
the putting task, with a corresponding surge in performance. If this were
true it would brace the argument that learning occurs but is masked by the
presence of the secondary task.
However, this resource relaxing explanation is premature in that it is
potentially confounded by a second explanation. The phenomenon of
'reminiscence' often mentioned in the motor-learning literature (Bakker,
Whiting & van der Brug, 1990; Eysenck, 1985; Schmidt, 1982; Singer, 1982;
Travis, 1936, 1937), involves, by definition, an unexpected increase in
performance following a period of no practice (Ammons, 1947; Eysenck,
1985; Hull, 1943). It occurs in massed practice conditions where
performance has been commonly documented to be depressed when
compared to spaced or distributed practice 2 (Ammons, 1947; Eysenck &
Frith, 1977; Kimble, 1949a; Kimble & Shatel, 1952; Reynolds & Adams, 1954;
Schmidt, 1975). Surges in performance are common following a period of
rest following on massed practice. The characteristics of the unstressed
implicit-learning curve in Figure 2.3 parallel those seen in the phenomenon
of reminiscence in that the depressed performance seen in the acquisition
I Calculation of an assumed initial skill level was required because pretesting of skill levels
in the implicit learning conditions was not possible in the first experiment as subjects would
have acquired explicit knowledge.
2 According to Schmidt (1975, p.74) "One of the fundamental variables defining the make-
up of the practice session is the scheduling of practice and rest pauses. When trials are
separated by large amounts of rest, with the rest between trials being as long as or longer
than the time in the trial itself, the practice session is said to be "distributed"; when the
amount of rest is shorter than the practice, the session is said to be "massed".
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trials was followed by a surge in performance after a rest period of 24
hours. What remains unclear, therefore, is whether this surge in
performance is the consequence of the withdrawal of the secondary task or
of the interposing of a significant rest period following on massed practice.
There has been considerable examination of the reminiscence phenomenon
(particularly in pursuit-rotor performance), but it has no unanimously
agreed explanation. Two opposing explanations have dominated the
attention of the literature - an Inhibition theory (Hull, 1943; Kimble,
1949a,b) and a Consolidation of Memory theory (Eysenck, 1964b, 1985).
According to the former, inhibition, in the form of physical or mental
fatigue, develops during massed practice and prevents manifestation of the
improvement normally evident following practice. Two types of inhibition
can be responsible - reactive inhibition ('R) or conditioned inhibition (SIR).
The essence of both is that the inhibitory agent, whatever it may be,
increases during massed practice to a point where it is depressing
performance, but loses its inhibiting properties during rest, allowing
performance to surge to an apparently higher post-rest level.
The alternative, consolidation of memory, explanation of reminiscence
(Eysenck, 1965, 1966) argues that improved post-rest performance is the
result of consolidation of previous learning. It is argued that performance
leads to cortical events or 'neural fixation processes' which, in order to
become available to the performer as learned behaviour, require a period of
rest in which to consolidate. Consolidation functions to safeguard 'memory
traces' against destruction via brain disturbances. A by-product is improved
performance, which, according to Walker (1958) and Walker & Tarte (1963),
occurs as a result of temporary inhibition of recall or "action decrement"
while permanent memory is being laid down during the consolidation
period. It follows that learning will only manifest itself in improved
performance once consolidation has taken place, that is, following a period
of no practice. Many failings, both theoretical and empirical, come with
these explanations of reminiscence. They are irritatingly cumbersome in
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accounting for numerous questions raised in the reminiscence literature.
Eysenck & Frith (1977) provide a thorough summary of this.
In spite of the difficulty in accounting for the reminiscence phenomenon, it
is something that must be addressed if the explanation of the effects of
stress on performance put forward in Study 1 are to be accepted at their
face value. Of course, the whole reminiscence argument together with the
potential confounding to which it can lead hangs or falls on whether the
practice conditions in the study were truly massed. This can be accounted
for by exaggerating the degree of massing and spacing of the practice
conditions. This is done in the experiment to be reported which is designed
to resolve the potentially confounding effect of reminiscence in the
explanation of the effects found.
Put more succintly, the aim of the present study is to clarify whether surges
in performance following withdrawal of secondary task restricitons in
implicit learning situations can truly be attributed to an easing of demands
on processing resources.
The avenue of exploration taken will be to contrast post-secondary task
performance following massed versus spaced practice. If performance in
massed conditions only is depressed during acquisition, and reminiscence
occurs following rest in these conditions, then this would indicate the
presence of a reminiscence phenomenon as a confounding explanation of
the post-secondary task improvement of performance in the earlier study.
3.2 Method
Subjects
Forty-six paid, novice golf putters were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions: implicit learning - massed (IL-M), implicit learning - spaced (IL-
S), control - massed (CON-M) and control - spaced (CON-S). Both massed
practice groups consisted of 12 subjects (mean age = 19.6 years, SD = 1.1),
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whereas both spaced practice groups consisted of 11 subjects (mean
age = 20.3 years, SD = 2.4). Males and females were equally proportioned in
each group.
Apparatus
A left or right handed 'Ping' golf putter was used by all subjects. These
were 35 in. (88.9 cm) in length with standard angle of lie and loft for a Ping
'Anser' putter. 'Titleist tour 100' golf balls of standard dimensions (size 1.68
in. [4.27 cm]) were used. Putts were made from a distance of 200 cm at a
hole 10.8 cm in diameter (as set down by the United States Professional Golf
Association [PGA]). The putting surface was green, short-tufted artificial
grass stretched on a level dais elevated 11 cm from the ground. An
electronic metronome was used to emit 'clicks' at regular 1.5 s or 1.0 s
intervals in the secondary task conditions. All secondary task responses
were recorded on audiotape.
Design
The golf-putting skill was learned by the four different groups over an
acquisition phase, consisting of two practice sessions on each day for two
consecutive days. In each session participants made 125 putts (a total of 500
attempts). This was followed by a post-rest test session some 24 hours later,
in which participants made a further 125 putts. The percentage of putts
entering the hole acted as the dependent variable.
Procedure
No inter-trial intervals were allowed in the massed practice groups (IL-M &
CON-M), whereas inter-trial rest intervals of 30 s were enforced following
each subset of 5 putts in the spaced practice groups (IL-S & CON-S). A 5-
trial block consisted of approximately 15-20 s performance time. The
criterion for spacing of practice in these conditions was based on Schmidt's
(1975) definition of spaced practice and on the fact that such spacing falls in
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the midground of spacing conditions employed in the reminiscence
literature (Eysenck & Frith, 1977). During each interval the participant was
required to fit pieces in a jig-saw puzzle. This was deemed a satisfactory
method of prohibiting contemplation of the putting task. All participants
were required to read a standard statement at initiation of the experiment
explaining that they would receive a small payment, and requesting that
they not practise or rehearse the putting skill outside the laboratory.
Additional instructions were given in each condition. In the implicit
learning groups (IL-M & IL-S) participants were required to carry out
Baddeley's (1966) random letter generation task whilst putting. As in Study
1 they were instructed to call out a random letter each time an electronic
metronome 'clicked' [see Appendix 2]. Clicks sounded every 1.5 s during
the first and second sessions of the acquisition phase, but every 1.0 s during
the latter two sessions of the acquisition phase. It was necessary to decrease
the time between clicks in order to avoid diversion of processing capacity to
the putting task as participants became more efficient at random letter
generation. It was emphasised that priority be given to maintaining the
randomness of the letters in the secondary task at all times. One minute of
practice at this was allowed at the beginning of the first session. The
secondary task was discontinued in the post-rest test phase.
In the two control groups (CON-M & CON-S) participants were required to
learn for themselves (discovery learning). Each group acted as a control for
post-rest comparison with its related implicit learning group.
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3.3 Results
Initial ability. Pretesting and matching of initial skill levels was not possible
in the implicit learning groups. This would have required foregoing the
secondary task and hence allowing an opportunity for accretion of explicit
knowledge. Subjects were therefore assigned to the four conditions
randomly (on the assumption that their initial skill level would be matched
across groups) and the mean number of putts holed in the first 5 attempts
was used as a surrogate pretest of initial skill level - on the grounds that
little skill acquisition would be expected over so few trials. Computed as a
percentage the means for the IL-M, CON-M, IL-S and CON-S groups
respectively were 11.7, 31.7, 14.5 and 27.3 %. Individual percentages ranged
from 0 to 80 %. One-way analysis of variance revealed no significant
differences [F(3,42) = 2.04, p> .12], giving confidence that the groups were
matched for initial putting ability.
Acquisition-Phase Performance. For general analysis purposes performance
was computed over consecutive 25-putt trial blocks. Analysis of the
performance trends over the acquisition phase only (500 putts) was carried
out by split plot analysis of variance (groups x trial blocks; 4 x 20). Highly
significant main effects were revealed for both groups [F(3,42) = 7.22,
p < .0011 and trial blocks [F(19,798) = 14.47, p < .001]. The lack of a
significant interaction however [F(57,798) = 1.05, p > .37], shows that
although significant improvements occurred in the groups over practice, the
conditions did not have different effects on actual learning. The highly
significant main effect of groups suggests there were overall differences in
performance level. Consideration of Figure 3.1 reveals that the IL-M group
performed at the lowest level throughout acquisition, hinting that massed
practice of putting, in conjunction with the secondary task, may have
depressed performance. Computation of Tukey's Test of honestly
significant difference for the mean performance levels over the full 500
putts showed the IL-M group to have significantly poorer performance than
both the CON-M and CON-S groups (p < .05), but not the IL-S group.
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Reminiscence. Reminiscence scores were calculated for each group by
finding the percentage difference between the last 5 trials in the acquisition
phase and the first 5 trials after the 24-hour rest period. As is illustrated in
Figure 3.1, the reminiscence scores were minimal (-5, -8.4, 9.2 and -12.8 %
for the IL-M, CON-M, IL-S and CON-S groups respectively). The absence of
a significant difference between the scores [F(3,42) = .68, p > .57], implies
that although massed practice of the putting and secondary task resulted in
depression of performance a reminiscence effect did not follow.
Test-Phase Performance. Split plot analysis of the performance trends over the
test phase only (groups x trial blocks; 4 x 5) revealed significant main effects
of groups [F(3,42) = 3.03, p <.04] and trial blocks [F(4,168] = 3.13, p < .02],
but no significant interaction [F(12,168) = .80, p > .65]. Similarly to the
acquisition phase, significant improvements took place in the groups over
the test phase but the conditions involved did not have a different impact
on learning.
3.4 Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to explore whether the surge in
performance seen upon withdrawal of the secondary task in the unstressed
implicit learning condition in Study 1 resulted from an easing of demands
on processing resources or as a consequence of a rest period following on
massed practice (the so-called reminiscence effect). It was argued that if
massed practice caused depressed performance and was followed by a
surge in performance after rest, but spaced practice (Ed not, then this would
indicate the presence of a reminiscence effect.
The similar performance of the spaced and massed control groups indicates
that massed practice of putting alone is no more detrimental to performance
than spaced practice. The slightly (although nonsignificantly) lower
performance of the massed implicit learning group when contrasted with
the spaced implicit learning group could, however, be taken to suggest that
a combination of secondary task and putting task may be more affected by
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the massing of practice. This seems intuitively sensible if one accepts that
putting is a discrete rather than continuous task. According to Schmidt
(1975, p.78) "the practice time for a discrete task such as throwing a ball is
very short for each trial, and it is apparently difficult for massing to cause a
build-up of fatigue or boredom in so short a period". This may be the case
when putting alone, but the addition of a continuous random letter
generation task may well increase the possibility that massing will lead to
fatigue or boredom.
Of greatest importance is the absence of a reminiscence effect in the
designated massed practice groups. This suggests that the previously
reported surge in performance following on the removal of the secondary
task was not confounded by a reminiscence effect.
If anything, a slight degradation of performance is apparent in the two
massed practice groups following rest. This can be explained in terms of the
'warm-up decrement' phenomenon (Schmidt, 1982), seen to occur in
discontinuous skills - such as golf-putting - and purportedly related to the
loss of a temporary 'activity-set' suitable for performance (Nacson &
Schmidt, 1971; Schmidt & Nacson, 1980; Schmidt & Wrisberg, 1971).
Suspension of the secondary task in the implicit learning groups may have
exacerbated this warm-up decrement by altering the task and to some
extent making the old activity-set redundant.
Although there is no increase in performance in any group immediately
following rest it is relevant that both implicit learning groups, but not the
control groups, do show a surge in performance over the next block of
trials. This suggests that lifting the embargo on processing resources by
withdrawing the secondary task was indeed responsible for the surge in
performance in the unstressed implicit learning group in Study 1.
It must be concluded that although the presence of a secondary task in
implicit learning may depress performance it is the easing of processsing
demands that leads to surges in performance upon withdrawal of the
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secondary task, and not reminiscence. Having said this, it can be argued,
somewhat anecdotally perhaps, that of the two implicit learning groups the
most superior performance came from the spaced practice condition and the
worst performance came from the massed practice condition, so a
speculative recommendation for future research employing secondary tasks
in implicit learning paradigms is that a spaced practice structuring of
acquisition sessions be used.
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'Reinvestment': A dimension of personality
implicated in skill breakdown under pressure.
4.1 An introduction to Studys' 3, 4, 5 & 6
Study 1 explored the stress resistance of skills learned either implicitly (with
a small pool of explicit knowledge) or explicitly (with a large pool of explicit
knowledge). Although the findings were not conclusive, evidence was
produced that suggested an implicitly learned skill may be less likely to fail
under pressure than an explicitly learned skill. This evidence was only
trend-wise as the stress intervention did not result in significant decrements
in performance in the explicit learning and stressed control groups. The
trends were accounted for by arguing that in the latter condition
Ideautomatisation' - the disruption of the automaticity of skilled performance
- was more likely to take place as a result of purposefully endeavouring to
run the skill with explicitly available knowledge of it, that is, by "reinvesting
actions and percepts with attention" (Deikman, 1969, p.31). A number of
examples from the literature support this view (Baddeley & Woodhead,
1982; Eysenck, 1982; Hammond, 1987; Henry & Rogers, 1960; Klatzky, 1984;
Schmidt, 1982).
None of the cited writers, however, were led to suggest that reinvestment of
controlled or conscious processing may be a dimension of personality; some
* Based on Masters, R.S.W., Polman, R.C.J. and Hammond, N.V. 'Reinvestment': A
dimension of personality implicated in skill breakdown under pressure. Personality and
Individual Differences, (in press).
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individuals having a greater or lesser predisposition than others to reinvest
actions and percepts with attention - particularly when under pressure.
This idea has some face validity when viewed in the light of a conclusion by
Henry (1960) that there are statistically reliable individual differences in the
tendency to use sensory set or motor set when performing a motor skill; a
motor set is a focus on the movement itself, rather like reinvestment,
whereas a sensory set is a focus on external stimuli associated with the
movement.
The first real hint of a reinvestment dimension emerged in the Study 1 when
it was found that the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent et al, 1982)
tended to predict failure of a putting skill under pressure (r = .60, n = 8,
p = .057). The CFQ assesses the tendency to have 'slips of action' - occasions
on which ones actions "do not proceed in accordance with intention"
(Broadbent et al, 1982, p.1). It was argued that if such slips of action are in
some way the result of an inherent flaw in automatic processing or if the
automatic processing system in some individuals can be more easily
disrupted than in others then this same flaw may be the root cause of
'deautomatisation' under pressure.
In relation to this, there is evidence that a greater predisposition to cognitive
failure increases an individual's vulnerability to stress. For instance,
Freeman, Weeks & Kende11 (1980) found that student nurses failing their
final-year examinations had higher CFQ scores. Although the strength of this
finding was limited, Broadbent et al (1982) showed more conclusively that
the state of health of nurses under highly stressed conditions was correlated
with their CFQ scores, concluding that "high CFQ, in other words, is a
vulnerability factor making the individual less able to resist the effects of
stress" (p.11).
An additional component of reinvestment may be 'rehearsal'. Rehearsal is
one of four factors surfacing in the Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger
& Nesshoever, 1987). The questionnaire (ECQ) was developed to assess
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individual differences in emotional control - "a cognitive strategy aimed at
inhibiting the overt expression of emotional responses" (p.528). The rehearsal
factor is described as a tendency to mentally rehearse emotional events. The
link between rehearsal and reinvestment of conscious processing is self-
explanatory; the former involves rehearsal of emotional events, whereas the
latter involves rehearsal of rules associated with the skill.
There is also some evidence that rehearsal plays a role in the response to
stress. That is, individuals with a greater predisposition towards rehearsal
are more prone to high-level anxiety under pressure. For example, Roger &
Jamieson (1988) presented evidence suggesting that rehearsal scores
correlated with delays in heart-rate recovery following stress-inducing
Stroop task performance, and Roger (1988) presented evidence that rehearsal
scores correlated with increased cortisol levels amongst exam-pressured
student nurses. These findings suggest rehearsal may be implicated in the
stress /performance relationship.
Another component of reinvestment may be self-awareness, that is "...the
existence of self-directed attention, as a result of either transient situational
variables, chronic dispositions or both" (Fenigstein et al, 1975, p.522).
Conscious attention to the self may be caused by any circumstance causing
the individual to be 'self-evaluative'. Fenigstein et al (1975) constructed a
'Self-Consciousness Scale' (S-CS) to assess individual diferences in self-
awareness. Factor analysis of the scale gave a view of three different factors;
two different modes of self-consciousness (private and public) and a reaction
to these (social anxiety). The private self-consciousness factor was defined in
terms of the attention one gives to one's thought processes (e.g., I'm aware of
the way my mind works when I work through a problem), whereas public
self-consciousness was seen as an awareness of the self as a social object
affecting others (e.g., I'm concerned about what other people think of me).
The social anxiety factor was regarded as a 'by-product' of these two modes
of self-consciousness, on the grounds that an inward focusing of attention is
bound to give the individual something to be anxious about. It seems
plausible that private and public modes of self-consciousness may be a
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component of reinvestment - the greater the individual's predisposition
towards self-consciousness the greater the chance that that individual will
think about what he or she is doing and hence the greater the chance that
reinvestment of controlled processing will occur.
Fuel is added to the reinvestment-under-pressure perspective by the fact that
self-awareness has been shown to increase in situations resulting in
increased arousal (Fenigstein & Carver, 1978; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980).
Evaluative stituations, for example, have been shown to induce a state of
self-focus in individuals (Wicklund & Duval, 1971; Carver & Scheier, 1981).
The presence of a camera (Davis & Brock, 1975; Duval & Wicklund, 1972)
mirror (Carver, 1974, 1975; Scheier, 1976) or even an individual's own voice
(Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973) have received validation as manipulators of
self-focus.
Four studies will be described in the present chapter. The first abstracts a
factor associated with reinvestment from the above-mentioned scales, and
the second, third and fourth attempt to predictively validate it on the
premise that those with a high predisposition towards reinvestment will be
more likely to fail under pressure than those with a low reinvestment
predisposition.
4.2 Study 3
Rather than construct a completely new scale to explore the existence of a
reinvestment dimension, select items from the scales discussed were
incorporated into one questionnaire. The entire Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire (Broadbent et al, 1982) was employed, along with a revised
version of the Rehearsal factor from the Emotional Control Questionnaire
(Roger,1992) and the Private and Public factors from the Self-Consciousness
Scale (Fenigstein et al, 1975). This gave a questionnaire numbering 75 items:
25 from the CFQ, 33 from the ECQ and 17 from the S-CS.
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This corporate questionnaire was administered to a large body of the student
population of York University and the returns factor analysed in a search for
higher-order factors that might represent reinvestment.
4.2.1 Method and Results
Scale construction
A 75-item questionnaire consisting of 25 items from the CFQ, 33 from the
ECQ and 17 from the S-CS was administered to 71 female students (mean
age = 20.54 & SD = 4.36) and 73 male students (mean age = 21.28 &
SD = 5.15) of the University of York, England. The sets of items were
presented in random order. A dichotomised, forced-choice mode of response
was required, with participants offered an option of TRUE/FALSE or
YES/NO. This necessitated alteration of the Likert Scale response
possibilities of the CFQ and S-CS. Determination of response frequencies
showed that no item was endorsed in either direction by more than 80 % of
the sample.
Factor analysis
Principal axis factor analysis was carried out on the data. Scree testing
suggested a three-factor solution be sought. This was achieved with a
varimax rotation. As is the norm, loadings of greater than 0.30 were taken as
illustrating significance on the three factors. An oblique rotation was carried
out in conjunction with the orthogonal rotation, yielding similar results.
The first and third factors were of little interest in reinvestment terms. Factor
1 was predominated by items from the CFQ (19 out of 24), and Factor 3
consisted entirely of items from the ECQ (15 out of 15). The items and
loadings in each factor can be found in Appendices 4 & 5. The first factor
accounted for 8.9 % of the variance, whereas the third factor accounted for
4.4 %.
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The second factor, which accounted for 5.6 % of the variance, appeared
considerably more relevant in reinvestment terms. Twenty items loaded on
this factor, with a mixture of 12 from the S-CS, 7 from the ECQ and 1 from
the CFQ. The items and their loadings are presented in Table 4.1. The
highest loading of 0.50 was found for item 48 (I'm constantly examining my
motives). This item belonged to the private self-consciousness subscale of the
S-CS. The next highest loading of 0.48 was found for item 7 (I think about
ways of getting back at people who have made me angry long after the event
has happened). This item belonged to the rehearsal subscale of the ECQ.
Although the methods of categorising factors produced by factor analytic
methods are somewhat subjective the use of the term 'reinvestment' for the
second factor rather than the first or third seems justifiable for two reasons.
Firstly, and most importantly, the factor is more robust than the others, in
that it is made up of a mixture of items from all the scales, whereas, the third
factor consists only of rehearsal items and the first factor consists mainly of
cognitive failures items along with a few rehearsal items. The fact that this
relationship exists between the different items from the different scales
provides for greater breadth, and suggests a coherent, multi-dimensional
construct - reinvestment. A second, more anecdotal reason, is that the items
in Factor 2 are considerably more oriented towards internal thought
processes than those of Factors' 1 or 3. That is, the items directly refer to the
actual dynamic internal process of thinking about what one is doing. The
items in the remaining two factors seem to be less specific and to refer more
to the results of such processes.
Reliability
The three scales involved in the reinvestment factor have all been validated
and shown to be highly reliable. The rehearsal factor, for instance, is
reported by Roger & Nesshoever (1987) to have a highly satisfactory Kuder-
Richardson (KR-20) coefficient of 0.86. In the present instance coefficient
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alpha (Cronbach, 1951) was employed to evaluate the internal reliability of
the reinvestment factor. A suitably high value (0.80) was found.
Test-retest reliability was obtained by re-presenting the reinvestment scale
alone to a subsample of 40 of the original population after 4 months. A
Pearson product moment correlation coefficient of 0.74 was found between
the original and repeated scores.
4.2.2 Discussion
It appears on the surface that a 20-item scale of reinvestment may have
emerged from factor analysis of the combined cognitive failures, rehearsal
and public and private self-consciousness scales. This reinvestment factor is
dominated by rehearsal and public and private self-consciousness items and
has a relatively robust internal and test-retest reliability. It remains for
Studies 4, 5 and 6 to explore, via predictive validation, whether the scale
actually does assess a predisposition towards reinvestment of explicit
knowledge.
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Item Loading
Rehearsal
I remember things that upset me or make me angry for a long time afterwards. .32
I get "worked up" just thinking about things that have upset me in the past. .41
I often find myself thinking over and over about things that have made me angry. 36
I think about ways of getting back at people who have made me angry long after the
event has happened.
.48
I never forget people making me angry or upset, even about small things. .33
When I am reminded of my past failures, I feel as if they are happening all over again. .32
I worry less about the future than most people I know. ,32
Private self-consciousness
I'm always trying to figure myself out. 35
I reflect about myself a lot. .40
I'm constantly examing my motives. .50
I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself. .33
I'm alert to changes in my mood. .35
I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem. 39
Public self-consciousness
I'm concerned about my style of doing things. .44
I'm concerned about the way I present myself. .46
I'm self-conscious about the way I look. .36
I usually worry about making a good impression. .41
One of the last things I do before leaving my house is look in the mirror. 32
I'm concerned about what other people think of me. .46
Cognitive Failures
Do you have trouble making up your mind? 31
Table 4.1. Items and loadings on the second factor - Reinvestment
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4.3 Study 4
An attempt was made in the present study to validate the new Reinvestment
Scale by predicting that if the scale indeed assesses a predisposition towards
reinvestment of controlled processing, then a skill such as the two-
dimensional rod tracing task (Seashore, Dudek & Holtzman, 1949) will be
more likely to fail or deautomatise under pressure in those individuals
scoring high rather than low on the scale. In other words, the more likely the
performer is to attempt to execute the rod-tracing task by consciously
investing it with knowledge or rules the more likely that the performer's
skill will be disrupted under pressure. If this were found to be the case it
would provide validatory evidence for the Reinvestment Scale as a
personality dimension.
4.3.1 Method
Subjects
Study 3 revealed scores on the Reinvestment Scale ranging from a low of 1 to
a high of 20 (M = 9.81, SD = 4.37). Any score more than one standard
deviation above the mean was designated a high score (> 14.18), whereas
any score more than one standard deviation below the mean was designated
a low score (< 5.44). Of the population of 144 who completed the original 75-
item questionnaire, 22 scored high and 24 scored low on the reinvestment
scale.
Three groups were drawn from the pool: a high reinvesters group (N=8;
4 females & 4 males), a low reinvesters group (N=7; 4 females SE 3 males)
and a control group, consisting of 5 high reinvesters and 6 low reinvesters
(N=11; 5 females & 6 males).
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Apparatus
A two-dimensional rod tracing apparatus (Seashore et al, 1949) was
employed. This apparatus consisted of a length of copper rod 1 cm in
diameter and 180 cm in length, bent into a rough vertical "M" shape 55 cm in
height by 50 cm in width and mounted on a secure base. A hand held ring-
stylus 2.5 cm in diameter encircled the copper rod. The aim was to move the
stylus from one end of the rod to the other making as few errors as possible.
A BBC computer recorded the time taken to complete each circuit of the
apparatus, the number of contacts made and the length of each contact.
Measurement of changes in anxiety level under pressure were made using a
portable heart rate monitor (HRM-2) attached to the waist. Electrodes were
attached to the chest in 3 positions - one left of the sternum in the 4th
intercostal space, one right of the sternum in the 5th intercostal space and an
earthing electrode at the top of the sternum.
Procedure
In the first stage of the study participants in the control group were required
to practice to asymptote on the rod tracing task. A spaced practice
arrangement was employed, with each trial being separated by a 30 s rest
interval in order to minimise fatigue effects. Spaced practice has generally
been shown to 'result in more effective performance than massed practice
(Eysenck & Frith, 1917).
The control group served two purposes. The first was to define the number
of acquisition trials required for performance to reach asymptote. This
allowed a target number of trials to be set for the high reinvesters and low
reinvesters groups so that both achieved a similar level of performance prior
to stress induction. The second purpose was to obtain a valid network of
explicit rules associated with performing the task, in order that the two
groups could be provided with a similar pool of explicit knowledge about
the skill. This network of rules was obtained by requiring participants to
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write down any information they had gained about the task during each
inter-trial interval. An added advantage was that it allowed inspection of
whether high and low reinvesters accumulated equivalent amounts of
explicit knowledge whilst acquiring the skill. It may be, for instance, that
high reinvesters tend to accumulate more skill-related rules.
Once this subsidiary information had been gathered from the control group
the second stage of the study, involving the high reinvesters group and low
reinvesters group, was run. This stage consisted of an acquisition phase
followed by a stress phase. In the acquisition phase participants made 15
practice trials, whereas in the stress phase they made 1 test trial. A spaced
practice arrangement was again employed. During each 30 s rest interval
participants were required to read a summarised list of the rules elicited
from the controls, with the specific aim of applying those rules to their
performance.
In all instances participants were told to make as few errors as possible, that
is, not to make contact with the copper tubing. In the acquisition phase it was
made clear that absolutely no emphasis was to be placed on time to complete
a trial. During the stress phase this was again emphasised.
Upon completion of the 15-trial acquisition phase participants received a 5
min rest interval. During the final minute of this interval a brief stress
induction statement was presented, explaining that one test trial was to be
completed, and that each contact made with the rod would result in a
reduction of 25 pence in the amount owed for participating in the
experiment [see Appendix 61. The apparatus was also altered so that upon
each contact a 'buzz' emanated from the computer, further increasing the
level of stress. In point of fact, money was not withdrawn. All participants
received the same amount.
Assessment of the level of anxiety engendered by this method was made by
monitoring the heart rate of each participant over the first trial of the
acquisition phase (following 5 min rest) and over the test trial (again
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following 5 min rest), thus allowing comparison of rested heart rate pre and
post stress-induction.
4.3.2 Results
The Control Group
Data were gathered from the control group (6 low reinvesters & 5 high
reinvesters) for two reasons. Firstly, to determine the number of trials
required for performance to reach asymptote, and secondly to form a
network of rules with which to instruct the experimental groups.
Asymptotic performance. Performance, in terms of the number of contacts
made in each trial, is plotted in Figure 4.1, for high and low reinvesters. It is
apparent that by the fifteenth trial both groups were nearing an asymptotic
plateau of performance. Therefore, it was decided that the experimental
groups should also receive 15 trials.
A two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures (groups x trials;
2 x 15) showed there were no significant differences between the groups
[F(1,9) = .18, ns], but revealed a highly significant main effect of trials
[F(14,126) = 5.39, p < .0011, confirming that performance improved over the
15 trials. A significant groups by trials interaction was also found
[F(14,126) = 2.10, p = .021; however, this appears to be due to the, perhaps
quirky, difference between the two groups from Trial 1 to Trial 2.
Rules. For each subject the number of technical rules associated with
performing the task was evaluated by two raters. Inter-rater reliability was
0.87. The mean number of rules produced by the low reinvesters was 5.25 as
opposed to 4.25 by the high reinvesters. An independent t-test revealed that
these were not significantly different, t(9) = 1.02, ns. Nine common
instructional items were explicated from the pooled list of rules. These were
rules such as, "rotate the ring with your fingers not your wrist" or "keep the
ring perpendicular to the copper rod" [see Appendix 7 for the full list].
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Figure 4.1. Mean number of contacts made on a 2-dimensional Rod Tracing
apparatus by high and low scorers on the Reinvestment Scale (control groups) over
15 acquisition trials
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The Experimental Groups
Stress Intervention. Heart rate was monitored over Trials 1 and 16 (pre- and
post-stress). The means and standard deviations for the high and low
reinvesters are presented in Table 4.2. Data from one subject in the low
reinvesters group was lost due to equipment failure. A two-way analysis of
variance with repeated measures (groups x pre- vs post-stress; 2 x 2)
revealed a highly significant main effect for pre- and post-stress
[F(1,9) = 15.16, p < .001], but not for groups [F(1,9) = .06, ns]. A significant
interaction was not found [F(1,9) = .18, ns]. These findings show that heart
rate in both groups increased significantly from Trial 1 to `In& 16 confirming
that the stress intervention was effective for both high and low reinvesters.
Time taken. The mean times taken to complete trials 14 and 15 (pre-stress)
and trial 16 (post-stress) were compared. These were 81.14 s pre-stress and
118.97 s post-stress for the low reinvesters and 65.31 s pre-stress and 87.95 s
post-stress for the high reinvesters. In both cases there appears to have been
a considerable slowing of performance under stress. This is supported by a
two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures (groups x times; 2 x 2)
which revealed no main effect of groups [F(1,10) = 2.44, nsl ex gvoup by time
interaction [F(1,10) = 1.24, ns] but did reveal a highly significant main effect
of times pre- and post-stress [F(1,10) = 22.04, p < .001]. Clearly, both groups
were similarly affected by the stress intervention. Such slowing of
performance is concordant with previous findings in the social facilitation
literature which show that complex tasks are performed more slowly in
situations where the subject is endeavouring to perform as errorlessly as
possible in an evaluative or stressful situation (Bond & Titus, 1983; Zajonc,
1972).
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Stress Intervention
Group	 Pre-	 Post-
High reinvestment 93.7 (9.4) 103.4 (9.7)
Low reinvestment 97.2 (6.3) 101.0 (10.4)
Table 4.2. Mean heart rate (beats per minute) and standard deviations (in
parentheses) for high and low reinvesters prior to stress intervention (Trial 1) and
after stress intervention (Trial 16)
Performance. From comparison of Figure 4.2 with Figure 4.1 it can be seen
that the experimental groups shadowed the control groups over the 15
acquisition trials. Two low reinvesters and one high reinvester were
excluded from the final analysis on the grounds that after 15 trials their
performance showed no signs of reaching asymptote. In all three cases on
Trial 15 performance was more than 3 standard deviations above the mean.
A two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures (groups x trials;
2 x 15) revealed a highly significant main effect of trials [F(14,140) = 6.93,
p < .0011 but no main effect of groups [F(1,10) = .25, ns] and no interaction
[F(14,140) = .94, ns]. As in the control condition, both high and low
reinvesters improved comparably over the 15 acquisition trials.
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Figure 4.2. Mean number of contacts made on a 2-dimensional Rod Tracing
apparatus by high and low scorers on the Reinvestment Scale (experimental groups)
over 15 acquisition trials and I stressed trial
Stressed performance. For the purposes of assessing the effects of the stress
intervention on performance in each group the mean number of contacts
made in Trials 14 and 15 (pre-stress) was compared with the mean number
made in Trial 16 (post-stress). The means and standard deviations are
presented in Table 4.3.
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Stress Intervention
Group	 Pre-	 Post-
High reinvestment 6.1 (3.3) 4.0 (6.4)
Low reinvestment 7.1 (4.5) 6.8 (5.6)
Table 4.3. Mean number of contacts and standard deviations (in parentheses) for
high and low reinvesters prior to stress intervention (Trials 14/15) and after stress
intervention (Trial 16)
A two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures (groups x contacts
pre- and post-stress; 2 x 2) was again computed; however, no significant
main effects or interaction were revealed (p > .10 in all cases).
A second dependent variable was considered at this point. The mean contact
time of the stylus-ring on the rod was examined for each group pre- and
post-stress. The mean contact times pre- and post-stress (Trials 14 and 15
versus 16) for the high and low reinvesters respectively were .30 and .55, and
.20 and .30 seconds.
Analysis was again made via two-way analysis of variance with repeated
measures (groups x contact time pre- and post-stress; 2 x 2), and again no
main effects or interaction were apparent (p > .10 in all cases).
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4.3.3 Discussion
There was no support for the prediction that high reinvesters would be more
likely to fail under pressure. Neither the number of contacts nor the contact
time was affected for high or low reinvesters under pressure. A number of
explanations of the lack of differences are possible. For instance, the small
number of subjects in each group may have been a restrictive factor,
although different trends in performance under stress are not apparent. An
alternative possibility is that the motor skill employed was not complex
enough and did not create the kind of demands that would call for greater
rule use. There is partial support for this explanation in the finding that
although adoption of a motor set prior to performance (concentration on the
movements of the skill itself) rather than a sensory set (concentration on the
stimulus) will result in slower reaction times (RT) and motor times (MT) in
complex skills the effect is minimal in simple skills (Henry, 1953; Pierson,
1959). If this was indeed the case it might be that an effect would be
apparent for a more complex, rule-bound skill.
4.4 Study 5
Study 4 explored whether differences in performance under pressure arise
between high and low reinvesters in more complex, rule-bound skills by
contrasting the scores of participants in an earlier study (Study 1, Chapter 2)
with their performance under pressure on a golf-putting task. Golf putting is
a more complex motor skill than the two-dimensional rod tracing task, as is
illustrated by the fact that in Study 1 learners of the putting task had not
even reached a 50 % success rate after some 500 trials, whereas, in the
present experiment asymptote occurred on the rod tracing task after a mere
15 trials.
4.4.1 Method
Reinvestment scores were obtained for participants from two similar
stressed groups in Study 1 - stressed control (S-CON) and explicit learning
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(EL). In Study 1 the S-CON group received no manipulation of its method of
learning the putting skill, whereas, the EL group received explicit instruction
in the correct putting technique. No differences in putting performance were
apparent between the two groups either before or after stress, so for the
purposes of the present study these groups were combined to give a more
sizeable group, comprising 7 females and 7 males (one male and one female
did not complete the scale). The method of invoking stress in Study 1 was
similar to that employed in Study 4, in that, a monetary inducement was
present; however, the earlier experiment enjoyed the security of an
additional stressor - evaluation apprehension. As in Study 4, it was
predicted that the putting performance of those scoring high on the
Reinvestment Scale would be more likely to fail than of those scoring low.
4.4.2 Results and Discussion
A Pearson product moment correlation coefficient was computed between
the reinvestment score for these 14 subjects and their putting-performance
differences from pre- to post-stress. A significant correlation, in the expected
direction, was found (r = .59, p < .05) .
The correlation between reinvestment scores and failure of skill in the
putting task, but not the rod tracing task, supports the explanation that the
latter task was too simple or too devoid of rules to result in reinvestment
under pressure. That is, the skill involved so few technical components about
which rules could be explicitly formed that there was little fuel for controlled
processing and therefore little chance of deautomatisation. On these grounds
it would be of interest to explore the relationship between reinvestment and
performance failure in skills such as chess, which involve no motoric
component but provide a rich source of failure under pressure. Study 5 was
followed up by a further study in which the predictive validity of the
reinvestment scale was, in a sense, tested in the field.
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4.5 Study 6
It was posited that often participators in sports such as squash, golf or tennis
gain an awareness, through experience, of whether their teammates tend to
'choke' or fail under pressure. If they were required to rate this tendency it
could then be correlated with the reinvestment score of the teammate, hence
providing a variation on the same predictive-validation theme. It could be
argued that such a method of adjudging the strength of the predisposition
towards failure of skill under pressure is more satisfactory because it does
not rely on artificial modes of stress induction'. Employing two raters in
order to ensure that the peer opinions are reliable should throw a little oil on
any disquietude about the use of such a 'stress-failure rating' technique.
4.5.1 Method
The highest ranked 12 male members of the University of York Squash Club
(mean age = 20.11 & SD = 3.97) and the highest ranked 12 male members of
the University of York Tennis Club (mean age = 21.56 & SD = 4.32) were
rated on their tendency to fail or 'choke' under pressure. These stress-failure
ratings were made independently by the President and Captain of each club
on a scale of 0 (never 'chokes' under pressure) to 4 (always 'chokes' under
pressure) [see Appendix 811. The Reinvestment Scale was administered to
each player.
4.5.2 Results and Discussion
The means and the standard deviations for the reinvestment scores and
stress-failure ratings in each sport are given in Table 4.4. Inter-rater
reliability was very strong in both cases; squash (.90) and tennis (.84). The
I An anecdotal illustration of the fact that peer performers are well equipped to categorise
the weaknesses of their teammates under pressure can be seen in a slang term coined
during the author's own university tennis-playing days, and still heard on the courts today.
The term, "a shummy", evolved as a direct result of general knowledge that a certain
member of the club, carrying the surname Shum, often, if not always, tended to double
fault on match point.
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mean of the two stress-failure ratings given for each player was taken as an
overall measure of predisposition towards skill failure under pressure. The
data for the two sports were grouped together and a Pearson product
moment correlation coefficient was computed between the mean stress-
failure rating and reinvestment score of each player. A strong correlation
was found (r = .64, p < .01)2.
The high inter-rater reliabilities suggest that it was reasonable to use the
opinions of teammates to assess the susceptibility of players to failure of skill
under pressure, although ideally this needs confirmation via a more direct
form of stress-failure rating. Most importantly, the correlation between the
tendency towards reinvestment and the tendency towards skill failure under
pressure broadens the support for the predictive validity of the
Reinvestment Scale.
Reinvestment Score	 Stress-failure Rating
Squash 7.6 (3.7) 2.0 (0.8)
Tennis 7.8 (2.9) 2.3 (1.0)
Table 4.4. Mean stress-failure ratings and scores on the Reinvestment Scale with
standard deviations (in parentheses) for tennis and squash separately
2 The correlations for the two sports when taken independently were (r . .70, p <.05) and
(r .-- .63, p < .05) for tennis and squash respectively.
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4.6 General Discussion
Based on work in Chapter 2 it was hypothesised that individuals may have a
predisposition towards 'reinvestment' of controlled processing, that is, a
tendency to introduce conscious control of a movement by isolating and
focusing on specific components of it.
In an attempt to establish a tool that would measure such a construct,
existing personality scales, related to the concept of reinvestment, were
administered to 144 students of the University of York. The scales were the
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), the Rehearsal factor of the
Emotional Control Questionnaire (ECQ) and the Public and Private factors of
the Self-Consciousness Scale (S-CS). Factor analysis extrapolated three
factors, of which the second fell within the confines of reinvestment. This
factor consisted of 20 items drawn mainly from Rehearsal, and Private and
Public Self-Consciousness and was dubbed 'The Reinvestment Scale'. A
highly satisfactory test-retest reliability and internal reliability was
evidenced.
It was argued that a high or low score on the Reinvestment Scale would be
indicative of a predisposition that would manifest itself in altered
performance under stress; specifically, high reinvesters would be more likely
to fail under stress than low reinvesters, due to a greater likelihood that they
would attempt to run their skill by consciously processing technical
knowledge of its functioning. In order to test this a predictive validation of
the Reinvestment Scale was carried out (Study 4). High and low reinvesters
were selected from the population and required to learn a two-dimensional
rod tracing test (with written technical instruction). The performance of the
high reinvesters was similar to that of the low reinvesters both before and
after stress intervention. In neither case was performance affected by stress,
despite the fact that anxiety levels, in terms of heart rates, increased
significantly.
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On the grounds that the task employed in Study 4 may have been
inappropriate a fifth study was carried out in which a correlation was found
between reinvestment and the failure under pressure of a more complex,
putting skill. This result can perhaps best be understood in terms of the idea
that in simple skills there is simply less that can go wrong, whereas, in
complex skills controlled processing has far more scope for disruption. For
example, if a skill is achieved with the aid of a central executive to compute
the necessary information and send the appropriate commands to the
muscles for execution (Marteniuk & Romanow, 1983), then the more
commands sent the greater the chance that disruption will occur.
A more sophisticated way to perceive this is the Neves & Anderson (1981)
concept of 'composition' during the development of automaticity. As
discussed in Chapter 1 composition is the chunking of "productions" to form
single, direct representations of actions. If stress results in 'decomposition' of
these direct representations and a regression to the use of the original lower-
order productions to run the skill (as in the early stages of acquisition), then
it follows that in a complex skill there will be more productions to
coordinate, making it more likely that the skill will fail. A very similar
account can be provided by Logan's (1988) Instance Theory, where stress
might result in a return to an explicit, algorithmic-based control of behaviour
through disruption of automatic retrieval of skill-based information from
memory; the more algorithmic information to be retrieved the greater the
risk of disruption. An analogy can be found in the often recounted, and
somewhat tragic, tale of the centipede, who, when asked to disclose which
foot moved when, never managed to walk again. The centipede's problem
was compounded by a multitude of legs.
The sixth study broadened the scope of the support for the Reinvestment
Scale as a method of identifying individuals more likely to fail under
pressure with the discovery of a strong correlation between reinvestment
scores and the stress-failure ratings of peer performers in tennis and squash.
The strength of this relationship lends a certain practical appeal to the
Reinvestment Scale in that coaches or managers could employ it in
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conjunction with their own opinions to identify performers likely to 'flop' on
the big occasion.
The indications are that reinvestment as a concept is quite valid, although
more research is required into the predictive power of the Reinvestment
Scale. Even at this early stage, however, it does appear to have some
potential as a method of identifying performers who may fail under
pressure.
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Conclusions
The main intention in this the final chapter will be to provide an overview of
the findings from the research, draw any conclusions warranted and discuss
the implications and practical applications of the work.
5.1 A summary of the aims and findings
The aim in Chapter 1 was to build a framework from which to explore why
the skill of apparently expert performers can sometimes fail under stress.
This was constructed from reference to literature as far reaching as the
implicit/explicit knowledge distinction (for example: Berry & Broadbent,
1984, 1987, 1988; Reber, 1967, 1976), skill acquisition theories (for example:
Anderson, 1982; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Logan, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin,
1977) and the role of stress in performance (for example: Baumeister, 1984;
Hardy & Fazey, 1987; Hockey & Hamilton, 1983; Morris & Liebert, 1969;
Parfitt & Hardy, 1987; Sanders, 1983; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976). It was seen
that the route from novice to expert is one in which knowledge of the motor
skill itself becomes less and less explicitly available to consciousness and
more and more automatically accessed, but in certain circumstances this
'automaticity' can be lost. At such times, often when stress leads the
performer to try consciously to exercise control over the execution of the
skill, failure occurs. It was also seen that knowledge can be compiled
implicitly and often has a strong influence on performance of the skill. Out
of this framework came the idea that if consciously available knowledge can
be reduced during the acquisition phase and accretion of implicit knowledge
therefore encouraged the performer will be less able to consciously control
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the skill due to a lack of explicit knowledge of how it functions. This implies
that under times of stress the skill will be less likely to fail.
The research set out in Study 1 (Chapter 2) to examine whether (a) it is
possible to control the number of explicit rules compiled while acquiring a
skill and (b) whether holding a small or nonexistent pool of such rules will
mean skill failure is less likely to occur. Individuals acquired a putting skill
either implicitly or explicitly. In acquiring the skill implicitly they were
required to practise whilst carrying out a random letter generation task - a
dual-task paradigm designed to limit the accretion of explicit rules or
knowledge. In acquiring the skill explicitly individuals were given
instructions obtained from well-known golf teaching manuals. These
methods were found to be effective in inducing explicit and implicit learning
- the implicit groups had few rules whereas the explicit group had many.
Performance improved in both cases, and although it occurred at a slightly
slower rate under the implicit learning conditions it was concluded that it is
possible to acquire a motor skill implicitly. With regard to performance
under stress there was a trend for implicit learning to be less likely to result
in degradation of performance than explicit learning; however, it must
again be emphasised that the stress intervention did not result in statistically
significant decrements in performance in the Explicit Learning or Stressed
Control groups. The argument that a trend existed was partly based on the
fact that of the two control groups learning by discovery, the group not
undergoing the stress intervention continued to improve in performance in
Session 5, whereas that group involved in the stress intervention exhibited
the opposite effect - a slight, but nonsignificant, decrease in performance. It
was concluded that there is some suggestion that reducing the pool of
explicit knowledge available to the performer will make it less possible for
the automaticity of the skill to be disrupted by controlled processing, and
hence the skill will be less likely to fail under conditions of stress.
The research in Study 2 (Chapter 3) removed doubts about use of a
secondary task to cause implicit learning. A pall over Study 1 was the doubt
about the improvements in performance exhibited by the implicit learning
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groups over practice. Although it was shown that learning occurred, there
was a possibility that the secondary task held the performance level down
and only allowed performance back to its initial level as the performer
acclimatised to carrying out the two tasks at once. This would have given a
false impression of learning. Initially, it was thought that the surge in
performance of the unstressed implicit learning group upon withdrawal of
the secondary task indicated that learning had occurred but had been
masked by the presence of the secondary task; however, this explanation,
despite its convenience, was felt to be premature in the light of a
confounding explanation that 'reminiscence' (Eysenck, 1985; Schmidt, 1982;
Travis, 1936) may have occurred.
An investigation of this confounding was launched on the grounds that to be
fully confident of the effects of stress on performance in the implicit learning
groups in the first experiment it was necessary to know whether
reminiscence also had an influence on performance. It was argued that if
both massed and spaced practice of the golf-putting skill and secondary task
resulted in depressed performance followed by a surge in performance
following withdrawal of the secondary task then reminiscence was not a
confounding explanation - reminiscence is a phenomenon only associated
with massed practice (Ammons, 1947; Eysenck & Frith, 1977). No
reminiscence effect was found, suggesting that learning was not hindered,
only masked, by the secondary task and allowing a conclusion that the
easing of processing demands brought about by removal of the secondary
task resulted in the apparent surge in performance.
With the dismissal of the reminiscence interpretation in Chapter 3 it was
possible to explore further the idea of reinvestment of controlled processing
first mentioned in Chapter I and expanded in Study I (Chapter 2). Study 3
(Chapter 4) argued that the tendency to try and consciously control one's
skill with available explicit knowledge may depend on a predisposition to
do so. A factor analysis of a number of relevant personality measures was
carried out in search of a scale with which to measure such a personality
dimension. The measures used were established scales, or part thereof, felt to
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be related to the reinvestment concept. They were the Cognitive Failures
Questionnaire (Broadbent et al, 1982), The Emotional Control Questionnaire
(Roger & Nesshoever, 1987) and the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et
al, 1975). A relevant 20-item factor was uncovered and was predictively
validated in three further studies. In the first of these (Study 4), it was
predicted that if the Reinvestment Scale is valid it should predict failures of
skill - those individuals scoring high being more likely to consciously try to
control their skill and hence more likely to fail than those scoring low.
Unfortunately, the skill employed - a two-dimensional rod tracing task -
showed no degradation under stress, and thus could not provide an
adequate test of the hypothesis. It is likely that it was not demanding enough
to result in greater rule use under stress so further studies were carried out.
Study 5 explored whether the prediction held for performance on the more
rule-bound golf-putting skill used in Study 1. The majority of participants
from two similarly stressed groups in Study 1 completed the scale in order
that their scores on it could be correlated with their performance under
stress. A significant relationship was found, showing that individuals with a
predisposition to reinvest their skill with controlled processing were more
likely to exhibit degradation of performance under stress.
A final study (Study 6) was carried out in an effort to further validate the
scale. This was based on peer opinions in squash and tennis of how team
mates perform under stress. Through experience, performers may gain an
insight into the way their team mates respond to stressful situations; the
penalty 'shoot-out' in football or 'match-point' down in tennis, for instance.
Members of the University of York's squash and tennis clubs were presented
with the scale and rated by each club's president and captain on their
tendency to 'choke'. Again, evidence was provided supporting the predictive
validity of the Reinvestment Scale - high reinvesters were more likely to be
rated as tending to fail under pressure. It was concluded that reinvestment
of controlled processing can be assessed by the Reinvestment Scale and is
strongly linked with skill failure under stress.
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5.2 Further Research
The research presented in this thesis explores implicit learning and
reinvestment in human motor skill. A number of avenues worth exploring
have been opened. Firstly, additional methods of enforcing implicit learning
would need to be developed. One method would be to employ a binaural
shadowing task, such as that used by Dawson & Schell (1982), Hicks (1975)
and Kinsbourne & Cook (1971) rather than a random letter generation task.
This would provide a number of stimulating possibilities. For instance,
explicit rules could be submerged amongst the shadowed material (i.e.,
prose). This would make it possible to control the number and type of rules
acquired by the individual. Comparisons could be made between the effect
of stress on individuals acquiring twenty different rules as opposed to two,
for example. Questions such as: do individuals become aware of the
submerged rules, and do they employ those rules, would need verifying?
It would also be possible to explore the idea of 'deautomatisation' (Deikman,
1969; Henry, 1960; Klatzky, 1984) more thoroughly. For instance, it is usually
argued that the physical characteristics accompanying automatic
performance are that it is smooth, effortless and fast, whereas those
accompanying novice performance are that it is effortful, erratic and slow
(Fitts & Posner, 1967; Klatzky, 1984). It seems logical, then, that a
deautomatised skill will be performed more slowly and less fluently.
Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1, Henry (1960) showed something similar
when he found that motor times on a lateral arm sweeping task were
significantly slower when one's attention was directed toward the motor
response itself rather than towards the stimulus - recall, deautomatisation
involves "reinvesting actions and percepts with attention" (Deikman, 1969,
p. 31). This has support from a number of authors who have argued that
direct execution of chunked procedures will be quicker than running an
action with each individual procedure itself (Anderson, 1982; Klatzky, 1984).
Salmoni (1989) took this further by suggesting that the the time taken to
carry out a skill is proportional to the number of productions fired. In a
sense, each production is an explicit rule used in executing a skill. If so, the
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time taken to execute the skill should be proportional to the number of rules
employed to run it. Hence, reinvestment of controlled processing under
stress would be expected to result in slower and less fluent performance on
the grounds that additional explicit rules are being brought into play. A way
to test this would be to have learners acquire a skill while shadowing prose
containing different numbers of explicit rules. If reinvestment does occur
under stress it might be that the time taken to execute the skill will indeed be
proportional to the number of explicit rules shadowed. A less fluent skill
might be indexed by a change in the amount of jerk, the rate of change of
acceleration (Hogan & Flash, 1987).
A study was contemplated to investigate this, but difficulties in obtaining
equipment prohibited it going ahead. The study was to have called upon
skilled golfers, who can be assumed to have automatic putting skills, to
perform under conditions of stress and no stress. Stress was to be induced by
involving participants in a 'highly' competitive situation, achieved by
offering the opportunity of foregoing the regular experimental fee in favour
of competing against the other participants in the experiment for a first prize
of up to E125.00 or second prize of up to £47.50. A minor variation on
Cottrell's (1972) theory of evaluation apprehension was used as an additional
stressor. Rather than employing specific coactive audience evaluation the
situation was to have required performance in front of a professional film
camera with a payment possible if performance was good enough. Exposure
to a camera is an experimental manipulation that has been shown to increase
levels of anxiety (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). The rate of change of
acceleration of the putter (or magnitude of 'jerk') was to be computed by an
acceleromotor as a measure of fluency of movement, with the expectation
that jerk would be greater on putts failing in the stress condition.
Furthermore, it was hoped that an insight may have been given into the
component parts of the skill which break down under stress. For example,
greater changes may occur in the follow-through than in the back-swing of
the putt, or vice versa.
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Along the same lines, although not making use of the shadowing technique,
it would be of interest to draw the classic Chase & Simon (1973a,b)
demonstration of chunking in chess experts into the reinvestment debate. A
problem with discussing reinvestment in experts is that once the skill is
automatic its execution no longer relies on the coordination of individually
controlled productions; chunking of the productions occurs to form single,
direct representations of the actions (Neves & Anderson, 1981). For
reinvestment of explicit knowledge to occur these direct representations
must somehow revert to their individual productions. Evidence from Fitts et
al (1961) and Fuchs (1962) shows that when a learner is stressed he or she can
regress to the use of simpler, lower level information. Fuchs (1962) called
this the 'progression-regression' hypothesis. Such evidence supports the case
for reinvestment as a major contributing factor to skill failure under stress,
although more direct evidence would be valuable. Chase & Simon showed
that expert chess players recalled more information at a single glance on a 5-
second recall test than non-experts, but only if the material to be recalled
conformed to realistic, as opposed to random, game situations. They
effectively argued that this superiority was due to the experts' ability to
chunk the material into meaningful units of information. This finding has
been replicated in skills as varied as bridge (Charness, 1979), music
(Sloboda, 1976), basketball (Allard, Graham & Paarsalu, 1980) and hockey
(Starkes & Deakin, 1984). One way to investigate whether stress interferes
with the chunking of information in some way would simply be to predict
that under stress experts should perform worse on the 5-second recall test for
material conforming to realistic game situations. Another method of
investigating this would be to take highly cognitive skills, such as dart
scoring, in which the scorer is required to calculate the total score made by
three throws (e.g., triple 8 + double 19 + single 3) and then subtract the total
from an starting score of 501. Chunking can occur in making mathematical
calculations (Ashcraft, 1982; Zbrodoff & Logan, 1986). Early in learning
calculating 'triple 8' might require the individual to make lower-order
calculations such as 8 + 8 = 16 followed by 16 + 8 = 24, but with expertise the
information will have been chunked into a more meaningful unit of
3 x 8 = 24 which is more rapid and requires fewer individual calculations. If
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stress interferes with chunked information by somehow fragmenting it one
would expect the dart scorer to make more lower-order calculations and
hence perform more slowly under stress than when not under stress. It
would be possible to assay the number of higher- and lower-order functions
by having the scorer make his or her calculations verbally or in writing.
A weakness in Study 1, signalled in that study's discussion, was that full
automaticity of skill was not achieved. Although it was argued that a degree
of automaticity was most definitely reached (Logan 1978, 1988; Schneider &
Fisk, 1982; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), it would be most interesting to
investigate the consequences of continuing skill acquisition in the various
conditions - particularly the implicit learning condition - until asymptote
was reached. Would an individual in the implicit learning condition become
so expert at the secondary task that most of his or her available processing
capacity could be given over to performance of the motor skill, hence
allowing the possibility of accretion of explicit knowledge? Or would the
motor skill somehow become immune to explicit interference, perhaps
because over the initial sessions a prefabricated coordination pattern or
'image of the act' (Whiting & den Brinker, 1982) had been formed? If such a
pattern was formed implicitly, explicit processing might never be required
for its execution. If so, the practical application would be for those novice to
a motor skill to initially acquire it implicitly. This would avoid the
impracticality of having to maintain use of the secondary task in the field,
over a long period of time and during competition. Another question is how
would extended implicit learning affect the actual acquisition of the skill
itself? Would the skill become better than an explicitly learned or discovery
learned skill? Would it be less likely to fail under stress, or indeed would it
even catch up to either the explicitly learned or discovery learned skill?
Future research might also consider some of the side issues arising from
Study 1. For instance, more could have been done with the secondary task
data, that is, the tape recorded random letters generated by each learner in
the implicit learning conditions. No assessment was made of how well each
learner maintained the randomness of their letter generation. It may have
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been that those participants who were less random were allowing
themselves more processing capacity with which to acquire the putting skill.
If so, they may have acquired a greater number of explicit rules and may
have been more likely to fail under stress than those maintaining a greater
degree of randomness in their letter generation.
There was also a weakness in the way in which the degree of explicit
knowledge accumulated by each learner was accessed in Study 1. To merely
ask the participant to write down anything they became aware of while
putting was less than ideal. The debate on how accurately we can articulate
our internal states or our actions has been a long one (for example, Titchener,
1912; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Sanderson, 1989).
Most who wish to access the learner's verbal knowledge do so by question
and answer, which, as Broadbent (1990) says, can be criticised on the
grounds that "the particular questions chosen by the experimenter may not
have been appropriate to the particular ideas of the person learning..." (p.47).
The persons knowledge may simply not be accessed by the questions asked.
The only alternatives appear to be to ask a variety of questions (Berry &
Broadbent, 1984, 1987; Broadbent et al, 1986) or to ask the person to express
their ideas on how they execute the action (Stanley et al, 1989). It is difficult
to know what would have been the most appropriate method of accessing
the explicit knowledge of the participants in Study 1. Perhaps it is of little
consequence, as the information was accessed from all conditions in the
same manner. More importantly, it must be noted that the ability to
articulate one's skill is by no means a vital component of expert performance
and may in fact hold performance back. For instance, Cooke (1965) showed
that good verbal knowledge can accompany very poor performance, and
Broadbent et al (1986), Morris & Rouse (1985) and Rouse & Morris (1986)
showed that allowing a learner the opportunity to form strong memories for
factual details about a skill does not necessarily mean they will perform
better. It has also been seen that instructing the learner to try and become
aware of the rules associated with the skill can slow learning (Berry &
Broadbent, 1988; Reber et al, 1980). Furthermore, Berry & Broadbent (1984)
even found, over all their studies, a significant negative correlation between
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good performance and the ability to articulate that performance - the worse
the performance the more the performer seemed to know about it. Funke &
Muller (1988) found this also.
This last finding can be explained in terms of the previously dicussed idea
that reinvestment can cause a regression from higher-order to lower-order
functioning (Neves & Anderson, 1981). The Neves & Anderson approach to
skill acquisition suggests that as learning progesses lower-order productions
are replaced by more complex, chunked, higher-order productions;
however, only the lower-order productions can support verbalisable
knowledge of performance - higher-order productions are more efficient and
so disregard much of the information utilised by lower-order productions. It
follows that the better the performance the more higher-order the
performer's functioning will be and the smaller the involvement of
verbalisable knowledge, but, the worse the performance the more lower-
order the performer's functioning will be and therefore the greater the
involvement of verbalisable knowledge. This implies that peak performances
which involve almost entirely higher-order functioning will be accompanied
by poor verbalisable recall of the performance, which is indeed one reported
characteristic of peak performance (Browne & Mahoney, 1984; Murphy &
White, 1978; Ravissa, 1977).
5.3 Practical Applications
It is clear from discussion so far that the value of implicit learning itself is
that it restricts the possibility of reinvestment. Methods of enforcing such
learning may be put into practice in the laboratory with relative ease, but
they have some obvious restrictions in the field. For instance, even over a
mere 400 putts in Study 1 the effectiveness of the dual task method of
restricting resource availability was beginning to wear off - as subjects
improved at executing the two tasks at once resources became available with
which to become aware of the primary, putting task. This was not a
particular problem in Study 1, but it would be over longer acquisition
periods. Admittedly, it would be possible to change the secondary task each
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time the individual becomes accustomed to it, but eventually the variations
on the dual task theme would become exhausted, or the overall effectiveness
would be degraded by a general improvement in the ability to work under
dual-task conditions. Finally, the impracticalities of using such methods in
the field are obvious. Few coaches would have the time, resources or
foresight to enforce implicit learning for all the years it takes to become an
expert, and few 13-year old 'lads' would be prepared to shout random letters
in time to an electronic metronome when out practising with their 'mates'.
A more simple, less rigorous approach would be for coaches to reduce their
emphasis on the technical content of the skills they teach. This is a
compromise and obviously would leave much room for acquiring explicit
knowledge about one's skill by discovery learning, but the pool of explicit
knowledge would at least not be unnecessarily enlarged. Additionally, there
are methods available in sport psychology which are often used to prevent
athletes focusing on specific parts of the skill. Preshot routines, for example,
have been claimed to do just this by encouraging the performer to focus on
the skill in a more wholistic way (Boutcher & Crews, 1987; Crews &
Boutcher, 1986). Ultimately the coach must find a balance between providing
explicit knowledge and encouraging accretion of implicit knowledge. If the
learner is holding the wrong end of the pool cue, or using a fist rather than
fingers to throw the dart, or bowling the cricket ball with a bent arm then the
coach must offer explicit, technical rules to get the learner back on the right
track'. On the other hand, the coach must remember that top performers
often execute their skills in ways divergent from the stereotyped ways of
doing them. Take, for instance, Borg's forehand, Al's shuffle, Florence
Griffith-Joiner's stride. They work not so much because they are more
effective techniques but because they are part of these performers' natural
armoury, and therefore implicitly developed rather than explicitly learned.
And yet, the [so called experts] blithely add these new techniques to their
instruction manuals and attempt to explicitly teach them to novices. This is
1 The Reinvestment Scale is of great value to the coach in finding the correct balance, for it
can provide information on the predisposition of the learner to reinvesting explicit
knowledge in the skill itself. If the learner is a low reinvester the coach will know that he or
she can afford to provide more technical advice about the skill than if the learner is a high
reinvester.
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so in all skills. For example, Louis Kenter (1976, p.48) discusses the very
complaint in connection with the piano:
"Altogether it is dangerous to put down cut-and-dried rules
about technique. I have heard pianists who had 'impossible'
hands which looked half crippled on the keyboard, and who did
all the things condemned by almost everybody else, perform
miracles of technical perfection. In matters of piano technique so
much depends on imagination, temperament and imponderable
things of the mind, and genius often proves that the impossible
is the only right solution - in short in Art there can be no
categorical rules and no simple solutions."
The problem is actually more complex than this if the modern learner is to
attempt to attain expertise the implicit way. 'Normal' participation in
modern Western culture requires a dominance of logical, rational, analytical
and verbal modes of consciousness, and as a result, explicit knowledge is
prized above all. Polanyi (1957, 1966) and Bruner (1960) both agree that
explicit knowledge is so much easier to deal with and so much less
subjective that Western societies in particular, place far greater emphasis and
value on it than implicit knowledge. Certainly, there is support for the idea
that society pushes the learner towards an analytical, logical mode of
functioning predominated by accretion of explicit knowledge. Ornstein
(1972, p.162) writes:
"Western educational systems largely concentrate on the verbal
and intellectual. We do not possess a large scale training system
for the other side...."
Corballis (1976, p.104) agrees:
"Some writers have urged that our materialistic Western culture
has forced too great an emphasis on the rational, analytic mode
of thought, to the neglect of the intuitive and the wholistic."
In sport there are further blocks to implicit learning. For example, talented
young performers come under pressures and expectations to conform to the
stereotyped methods of performance promoted by coaches, administrators,
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parents or peers. It is almost always that when a young performer is first
touted as a future star or potential champion that youngster has been noticed
while performing in a state of 'play' in which performance lacks reference to
anything analytical, logical or explicit 2; however, the moment coaches,
administrators or parents begin applying pressure to practise more, play
better, try harder and so on, there is ignition and acceleration of 'striving
activity':
"The receptive mode is aimed at maximising the intake of the
environment, and this mode would appear to originate and
function maximally in the infant state. The receptive mode is
gradually dominated, if not submerged, however, by the
progressive development of striving activity...."
(Deikman, 1973, p.69)
The ability of youngsters to perform outside the analytical, logical or explicit
mode of functioning is often alluded to in Eastern writings. For instance,
Herrigel (1953) cites his Zen master on this:
"...a child doesn't think: I will now let go of the finger in order to
grasp this other thing. Completely unselfconsciously, without
purpose, it turns from one to the other...."
(Herrigel, 1953, p.33)
As an adult this is not necessarily an easily achieved goal, as Suzuki (in
Herrigel, 1953, p.VII) reveals:
"Man is a thinking reed but his great works are done when he is
not calculating and thinking. "Childlikeness" has to be restored
with long years of training in the art of self-forgetfulness."
2 This is supported in part by Mandler (1984), who described the learning of pre-verbal
children as unselective and non-analytical, and Parkin & Streete (1988), who found that
implicit memory develops earlier than explicit memory.
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One wonders if Bjorn Borg achieved this state of 'childlikeness':
"A hundred per cent of my game is instinct. I never stop and
think I'm going to hit a ball cross-court or down the line. I just do
it."
(Borg, 1980, p.86)
One effective method of bridging the gap between implicit learning and
explicit knowledge has been developed by the author and is employed in his
capacity as a professional tennis and squash coach. This method he describes
as 'coaching by analogy'. The aim is to get the performer (often a novice) to
perform the to-be-learned skill using one general analogical rule which in
fact encompasses many technical rules necessary for successful execution of
the skill. The learner follows the simple analogy and inadvertantly employs
these rules. This appears to be a very effective method'. The author has been
heard to boast, on many occasions sadly, of the fact that he can teach the
most uncoordinated tennis hopeful to hit a top-spun forehand in less time
than it takes to claim "Bjorn Borg was the only tennis player". This rather
grand boast is accomplished by employing the right-handed triangle as an
analogy. The learner is asked to describe a right-handed triangle with his or
her tennis racquet and to bring it squarely up the hypotenuse. Figure 5.1
illustrates this. Once accomplished with reasonable accuracy and consistency
- most people manage it immediately - the learner is told that every time he
or she hits the ball to concentrate on nothing other than bringing the racquet
squarely up the hypotenuse. The physical implication of making such a
movement with the racquet is to impart top-spin to the tennis ball.
Disguised in the analogy are explicit rules often taught to beginners. For
example, brush up from beneath the ball, complete the swing with the
racquet above the ball, keep the wrist firm. The excerpt presented below
3 The method also negotiates the value-for-money problem which would raise its head if
the coach tried to avoid providing the torrent of explicit rules learners are used to paying
for.
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(Cox, 1975, p.39) gives an example of the traditional way in which the top-
spun forehand is taught:
"...take the racket head back parallel with the ground. In this
shot, as all others, the wrist has to be locked rigid, absolutely
firm, or the end product will be messy. Then move your left leg
in front of you, at an angle of 45 degrees, to a comfortable
position. The body should be at 90 degrees to the net and
sideways on. Keeping the racket at the same level at which it
was taken back, move it forwards and intend to meet the ball in
front of the left toe. Don't tuck the elbow right in and don't have
your arm straight out. The elbow should be slightly bent and
once more remember to keep the wrist locked. The more rhythm
the better but this will come in time. To finish the forehand, the
racket should continue over your left shoulder in the direction in
which you have hit the ball."
Figure 5.1. An illustration of the 'Analogical Forehand' method employed by the
author in teaching a top-spun forehand in tennis
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Clearly this method requires the learner to become aware of a far greater
number of explicit rules. Furthermore, there are obvious drawbacks in terms
of comprehending the instructions and achieving a desired result. In fact,
Annett (1988) argues effectively that translation from the action mode to the
verbal mode can only be made through imagery, as the verbal system does
not have direct access to the action mode. This suggests that to successfully
translate verbal instructions into action requires the instructions to stimulate
formation of appropriate imagery. It is debatable that traditional methods of
instruction such as those above succeed in this.
One of the most interesting applications of an implicit learning technique
such as the dual task method is that it may provide a treatment for problems
such as the 'yips' in golf or 'dartitis' in darts. Despite the many strange stories
which surround these afflictions they appear to be particularly severe forms
of reinvestment. Take for example the following description of the 'yips':
"...instead he [the putter] may suddenly become acutely
conscious of the movement he is about to make. What should be
an automatic unified movement, becomes a complicated
problem of consciously co-ordinating many separate small
movements."
(Cochran & Stubbs, 1976, p.1351
As has been shown, implicit learning can restrict much of what the
performer would normally become aware of when making the movement. It
may be possible to treat expert performers with problems of this nature by
getting them to relearn their skill implicitly. It may well be somewhat time
consuming to accomplish this, as individuals with such problems have
usually been performing for many years and have often acquired a very
large pool of explicit knowledge about the skill in an effort to cure it.
However, the time taken to relearn the skill implicitly may be seen as time
well spent, for this dreaded affliction has ended the career of many fine
performers.
[99]
Chapter 5: Conclusions
Finally, this thesis commenced with the words of a great novelist, Boris
Pasternak, so it seems appropriate to end with those of another great writer,
the Zen philosopher, Daisetz Suzuki. His words now require no explanation:
"Thinking is useful in many ways, but there are some occasions
when thinking interferes with the work, and you have to leave it
behind and let the unconscious come forward. In such cases, you
cease to be your own conscious master but become an
instrument in the hands of the unknown. The unknown has no
ego-consciousness and consequently no thought of winning the
contest. It is for this reason that the sword moves where it ought
to move and makes the contest end victoriously."
(Suzuki, 1959, p.133)
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Appendix 1: Instructions presented in the explicit learning condition (Study
1)
The following instructions in golf putting are borrowed in a slightly
modified form from books entitled 'Golf: The Skills of The Game' (Stirling,
1985) and 'The Young Golfer' (Saunders & Clark, 1977). You will receive
them at the beginning of each session. Always read them carefully and
follow them strictly, as they will show you the correct way to putt a golf ball.
Set the clubface behind the ball with the face at right angles to the hole,
and have all of the sole of the putter on the ground.
Use the reverse overlap grip. This means that the forefinger of the left hand
overlaps the little finger of the right hand. (Reverse this if you are left-
handed). There is a feeling of more control with the dominant hand when
using this hold, and this is an essential feeling to have when trying to roll
a ball along a line to a specific point.
Stand with the distance between the heels in the region of ten to twelve
inches (25-30 cm). ..The alignment of the shoulders, hips, knees and feet
should be parrallel to the ball-to-target line.
The body should be bent over until the eyeline is directly over the ball-to-
target line. Ideally, the person should feel that a balanced stillness can be
maintained in the body as the arms and putter make the stroke.
Ball position is also critical, as the ideal point of contact is when the putter
is travelling at the lowest point of its swinging arc. At this stage, it is
square and travelling through to the target.. ..Placing the back of the ball at
a point opposite the inside of the left heel gives the best opportunity of
achieving ...this.
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The actual swing of the putter is made by the arms with the hands serving
as the connecting link. Because of the forward bending at address, the arms
bend slightly and it is vitally important to maintain this degree of bend
throughout the stroke.
Another very important feeling is that of moving the top of the shaft and
the putter head back and through together. This cancels out wrist action....
In a good putting stroke, the putter should move back and through
smoothly, with the putter very low to the ground.
The most important thing about the putting stroke is to take a fairly short
backswing so that you can push the club firmly at the hole. Never take a
long bacicswing with a putt so that you have to slow down. Short back;
firm through.
Keep your head absolutely still. This will help you make the club travel in
a perfectly straight line. If you move your head, you will find the putter
travels off its line in the throughswing and is pulled in towards your feet.
Never look at the ball as it reaches the hole... .Always keep your head
perfectly still until you hear the ball drop in. Only look up once you hear it
drop, or once you're sure it's missed!"
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Appendix 2: Instructions presented in the implicit learning conditions (Study
1 & Study 2)
The following instructions are to be carried out while you are putting. You
will receive them at the beginning of each session. Always read them
carefully and follow them strictly.
"Imagine drawing letters of the alphabet from a hat one at a time,
calling them out, and replacing them. On each draw any of the 26
letters will therefore be equally likely to be selected. Such a
sequence would be completely jumbled or random and would not
be likely to comprise English words or alphabetic sequences such
as ABC or XYZ. You must call each randomly generated letter each
time you hear the click."
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Appendix 3: Stress induction statement presented in Study 1
Today is the final session. As explained at the beginning of the
experiment, this session will decide what payment will be made to
you. You will begin with a sum of £12.00 which can increase to
£15.00 or decrease to as little as £1.00. You will lose varying
amounts for missed putts or poor putts, and may gain lesser
amounts for good putts. The amount you gain or lose will be
decided by an expert in golf who will evaluate your performance
from behind this one-way mirror.
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Appendix 4: Items and loadings on the first factor - Factor 1 (Study 3)
Item
	
Loading
Rehearsal
I remember things that upset me or make me angry for a long time afterwards.	 .37
If I have to confront someone, I try not to think too much about it 	 .30
beforehand.
I seem to remember things that have upset me much less vividly than other people.
	
.42
I tend to get over upsets more quickly than most people. 	 .30
I never worry about my past failures.	 .35
Cognitive Failures
Do you find you sometimes forget why you went from one part of the house to the other? 	 .65
Do you ever fail to notice signposts on the road?
	
.64
Do you bump into people?	 .54
Do you ever find you forget whether you've turned off a light or a fire or locked the door? 	 .39
Do you fail to listen to people's names when you are meeting them? 	 .31
Do you ever say something and realise afterwards it might be taken as insulting?	 .45
Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are doing something else?	 .42
Do you sometimes lose your temper and regret it? 	 .39
Do you leave important letters unanswered for days? 	 .38
Do you ever find you forget which way to turn on a road you know well but rarely use? 	 .50
Do you sometimes fail to see what you want in a supermarket (although it's there)?	 .51
Do you sometimes find yourself suddenly wondering whether you've used a word	 .42
correctly?
Do you find you forget appointments? 	 .30
Do you occasionally forget where you put something like a newspaper or a book? 	 .42
Do you find you acddentally throw away the thing you want and keep what you meant to 	 .60
throw away - as in the example of throwing away the matchbox and putting the used
match in your pocket?
Do you ever daydream when you ought to be listening to something?
	 .34
Do you find you can't quite remember something although
	
.47
its on the tip of your tongue"?
Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?
	
.54
Do you drop things?
	 .59
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Appendix 5: Items and loadings on the third factor - Factor 3 (Study 3)
Item	 Loading
Rehearsal
I find it hard to get thoughts about things that have upset me out of my mind. 	 .53
If I see something that frightens or upsets me, the image of it stays in my mind for a long	 .37
time afterwards.
Thinking about upsetting things just seems to keep them going, so I try to put them out of	 .49
my mind.
If I lose out on something, I get over it quicIdy.	 .48
Even though I try to forget about things that have upset me, they keep coming back into
	
.42
my mind.
I often feel as if I'm just waiting for something bad to happen. 	 .53
When I am reminded of my past failures, I feel as if they are happening all over again. 	 .40
Upsetting things quickly lose their power to affect me.	 .43
Sometimes I have to force myself to concentrate on something else to keep unpleasant 	 .41
thoughts out of my mind.
Intrusive thoughts about my earlier unpleasant experiences make it difficult for me to keep 	 .43
my mind on a task.
Any reminder about a past failure brings back emotions related to it.	 .55
I wish I could banish from my mind the memories of past failures. 	 .43
Sometimes I get so involved thinking about things that have upset me I am unable to adopt 	 .59
a positive attitude towards anything.
I worry less about the future than most people I know. 	 .40
It takes me an unusually long time to get over unpleasant events.	 .36
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Appendix 6: Stress induction statement presented in Study 4
YOU WILL NOW MAKE ONE TRIAL ON THE APPARATUS. THIS WILL
BE A TEST TRIAL. EACH TIME YOU MAKE A CONTACT A BUZZER
WILL SOUND AND 25 PENCE WILL BE SUBTRACTED FROM THE SUM
OF 5 POUNDS OWED TO YOU.
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Appendices
Appendix 7: The list of rules for executing the two-dimensional rod tracing
task (Study 4)
1. Hold the stylus firmly in your fingertips and close to the loop
2. Take up a firm footing with your legs spread to the width of
your shoulders or greater.
3. Hold your arm with the elbow bent roughly at right angles to
your body.
4. Support your wrist with your free hand.
5. Move the stylus at a constant speed.
6. Rotate the loop with your fingers and not your wrist.
7. Always keep the loop perpendicular to the copper tubing.
8. Rotate the loop slowly and with great care at the corners.
9. Move your upper body in the same direction as the stylus
without moving your feet.
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Appendices
Appendix 8: The Stress-failure Rating Scale employed in Study 6
In the following spaces please rank who you feel to be the top 12 players in
your club. On the scale alongside indicate your opinion of how likely the
player is to 'choke' or fail when performing under pressure.
Never Seldom Occasional Often Always
1. 0 1 2 3 4
2. 0 1 2 3 4
3. 0 1 2 3 4
4. 0 1 2 3 4
5. 0 1 2 3 4
6. 0 1 2 3 4
7. 0 1 2 3 4
8. 0 1 2 3 4
9. 0 1 2 3 4
10. 0 1 2 3 4
11. 0 1 2 3 4
12. 0 1 2 3 4
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